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Abstract—By sharing resources among different cloud
providers, the paradigm of federated clouds exploits temporal
availability of resources and geographical diversity of operational
costs for efficient job service. While interoperability issues across
different cloud platforms in a cloud federation have been exten-
sively studied, fundamental questions on cloud economics remain:
When and how should a cloud trade resources (e.g., virtual
machines) with others, such that its net profit is maximized over
the long run, while a close-to-optimal social welfare in the entire
federation can also be guaranteed? To answer this question,
a number of important, inter-related decisions, including job
scheduling, server provisioning and resource pricing, should
be dynamically and jointly made, while the long-term profit
optimality is pursued. In this work, we design efficient algorithms
for inter-cloud virtual machine (VM) trading and scheduling
in a cloud federation. For VM transactions among clouds, we
design a double-auction based mechanism that is strategyproof,
individual rational, ex-post budget balanced, and efficient to
execute over time. Closely combined with the auction mechanism
is a dynamic VM trading and scheduling algorithm, which
carefully decides the true valuations of VMs in the auction,
optimally schedules stochastic job arrivals with different SLAs
onto the VMs, and judiciously turns on and off servers based on
the current electricity prices. Through rigorous analysis, we show
that each individual cloud, by carrying out the dynamic algorithm
in the online double auction, can achieve a time-averaged profit
arbitrarily close to the offline optimum. Asymptotic optimality
in social welfare is also achieved under homogeneous cloud
settings. We carry out simulations to verify the effectiveness of
our algorithms, and examine the achievable social welfare under
heterogeneous cloud settings, as driven by the real-world Google
cluster usage traces.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emerging federated cloud paradigm advocates sharing
of disparate cloud services (in separate data centers) from
different cloud providers, and interconnects them based on
common standards and policies to provide a universal environ-
ment for cloud computing. Such a cloud federation exploits
temporal and spatial availability of resources (e.g., virtual
machines) and diversity of operational costs (e.g., electricity
prices): when a cloud experiences a burst of incoming jobs, it
may resort to VMs from other clouds with idle resources; when
the electricity price for running servers and VMs is high at one
cloud data center, the cloud can schedule jobs onto other cloud
data centers with lower electricity charge at the moment. In
this way, the aggregate job processing capacity of the cloud
federation can be potentially higher than the aggregation of
capacities of separate clouds operating alone, and the overall
profit can be larger.
To implement the federated cloud paradigm, significant
interest has arisen on developing interfaces and standards
to enable cloud interoperability and job portability across
different cloud platforms ( [1] [2]). However, fundamental
problems on cloud economics remain to be investigated. A
cloud in the real world is selfish, and aims to maximize its
own profit, i.e., its income from handling jobs and leasing VMs
to other clouds subtracting its operational costs and expenses
in VM rental from other clouds. Only if its profit can be
maximized and in any case not lower than when operating
alone, can a cloud be incentivized to join a federation. This
calls for an efficient mechanism to carry out resource trading
and scheduling among federated clouds, to achieve profit
maximization for individual clouds, as well as to perform well
in social welfare. A number of inter-related, practical decisions
are involved: (1) VM pricing: what mechanism should be
advocated for VM sale and purchase among the clouds, and
at what prices? (2) Job scheduling: with time-varying job
arrivals at each cloud, targeting different resources and SLA
requirements, should a cloud serve the jobs right away or later,
to exploit time-varying electricity prices? And should a cloud
serve a job using its own resources or others’ resources? (3)
Server provisioning: is it more beneficial for a cloud to keep
many of its servers running to serve jobs of its own and from
others, or to turn some of them down to save electricity? These
decisions should be efficiently and optimally made in an online
fashion, while guaranteeing long-term optimality of individual
cloud’s profits, as well as the social welfare.
In this paper, we design efficient algorithms for inter-cloud
resource trading and scheduling, in a federation consisting of
disparate cloud data centers. A double-auction based mecha-
nism is proposed for the sell and purchase of available VMs
across cloud boundaries over time. The auction is strategy-
proof, individual rational, ex-post budget balanced, and com-
putationally efficient (polynomial time complexity). Closely
combined with the auction mechanism is an efficient, dynamic
VM trading and scheduling algorithm, which carefully decides
the true valuations of VMs to participate in the auction,
optimally schedules randomly-arriving jobs with different re-
source requirements (e.g., number of VMs) and SLAs (e.g.,
maximum job scheduling delay) onto different data centers,
and judiciously turns on and off servers in the clouds based
on the current electricity prices. The dynamic algorithm serves
as an efficient strategy for each cloud to employ in the online
double auction, and is proven to maximize individual profit for
each cloud, over the long run of the system. The contributions
of this work are summarized below.
First, among the first in the literature, we address selfishness
of individual clouds in a cloud federation, and design efficient
2mechanisms to maximize the net profit of each cloud. This
profit is not only guaranteed to be larger than that when the
cloud operates alone, but also maximized over the long run, in
the presence of time-varying job arrivals and electricity prices
at the cloud.
Second, we novelly combine a truthful double auction
mechanism with stochastic Lyapunov optimization techniques,
and design an online VM trading and scheduling algorithm, for
a cloud to optimally price the VMs and to judiciously schedule
the VM and server usages. Each cloud values different VMs
based on the back pressure in job queue scheduling, and bids
them in the auction for effective VM acquisition.
Third, we demonstrate that by applying the dynamic algo-
rithm in the online double auction, each cloud can achieve
a time-averaged profit arbitrarily close to its offline optimum
(obtained if the cloud knows complete information on incom-
ing jobs and electricity prices in the entire time span). We also
prove that the social welfare, i.e., the time-averaged overall
profit in the federation, can be asymptotically maximized when
the number of clouds grows, under homogenous cloud settings.
Trace-driven simulations examine the achievable social wel-
fare with our dynamic algorithm under heterogenous settings.
In the rest of the paper, we discuss related literature in
Sec. II, present the system model in Sec. III, and introduce
the detailed resource trading and scheduling mechanisms in
Sec. IV. A double auction mechanism is proposed in Sec. V,
and a benchmark social-welfare maximization algorithm is
discussed in Sec. VI. Theoretical analysis and simulation
studies are presented in Sec. VII and Sec. VIII, respectively.
Sec. IX concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Optimal Scheduling in Cloud Systems
Most existing literature ([3]–[6] and references therein) on
resource scheduling in cloud systems focus on a single cloud
that operates alone. A common theme is to minimize the
operational costs (mainly consisting of electricity bills) in one
or multiple data centers of the cloud, while providing certain
performance guarantee of job scheduling, e.g., in terms of
average job completion times [3]–[6].
Urgaonkar et al. [5] propose an algorithm with joint job
admission control, routing and resource allocation for power
consumption reduction in a virtualized data center. Rao et
al. [3] advocate minimization of electricity expenses by ex-
ploiting the temporal and spatial diversities of electricity
prices. Yao et al. [6] minimize the power cost with a two-time
scale algorithm for delay tolerant workloads. Ren et al. [4] also
aim to minimize the energy cost while addressing the fairness
in resource allocation. All the above works provide average
delay guarantees for job services.
Different from these studies on a stand-alone cloud with
centralized control, this work investigates profit maximization
for individual selfish clouds in a federation, where each par-
ticipant makes its own decisions. Besides, bounded scheduling
delay for each job is guaranteed even in worst cases, contrast-
ing the existing solutions that ensure average delays.
B. Resource Trading Mechanisms
A rich body of literature is devoted to resource trading
in grid computing [7] and wireless spectrum leasing [8] [9].
Various mechanisms have been studied, e.g., bargaining [7],
fixed or dynamic pricing based on a contract or the supply-
demand ratio [10], and auctions [8] [9].
A bargaining mechanism [7] typically has an unacceptable
complexity by negotiating between each pair of traders. Fixed
pricing, e.g., Amazon EC2 on-demand instances, has been
shown to be inefficient in social welfare maximization in
cases of system dynamics [11]. Dynamic pricing, such as
Amazon EC2 spot instances, could be inefficient too, where
the participants can quote the resources untruthfully [12].
Auction stands out as a promising mechanism, on which
there have been abundant solutions ([8], [9] and references
therein) with truthful design and polynomial complexity. Al-
though some recent works [11]–[13] aim to design an auction
mechanism with individual rationality (non-negative profit
gain) for trading in federated clouds, they do not explicitly
address individual profit maximization over the long run,
nor other desirable properties such as truthfulness, ex-post
budget balance, and social welfare maximization. Moreover,
little literature on auctions provides methods to quantitatively
calculate the true valuations in each bid, which are simply
assumed as known. Our design addresses these issues.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND AUCTION FRAMEWORK
A. Federation of Clouds
We consider a federation of F clouds, each located at a
different geometric location and operates autonomously to gain
profit by serving its customers’ job requests, managing server
provisioning and trading resources with other clouds.
Service demands: Each individual cloud i ∈ [1, F ] has
a front-end proxy server, which accepts job requests from
its customers. There are S types of jobs serviced at each
cloud, each specified by a three-tuple < ms, gs, ds >. Here,
ms ∈ [1,M ] specifies the type of the required VM instances,
where M is the maximum number of VM types, and each
type corresponds to a different set of configurations of CPU,
storage and memory; gs is the number of type-ms VMs that
the job needs simultaneously (See Amazon EC2 API [10]);
and ds stands for the SLA (Service Level Agreement) of job
type s ∈ [1, S], evaluated by the maximal response delay for
scheduling a job, i.e., the time-span from when the job arrives
to when it starts to run on scheduled VMs. In a cloud in
practice, it is common to buy servers of the same configuration
and provision the same type of VMs on one machine [14].
Therefore, we suppose each cloud i has Nmi homogenous
servers to provision VMs of type m ∈ [1,M ], each of which
can provide a maximum of Cmi VMs of this type; the total
number of servers in cloud i is
∑M
m=1N
m
i .
The system runs in a time-slotted fashion. At the beginning
of each time slot t, rsi (t) ∈ [0, Rsi ] jobs arrive at cloud i, for
each job type s. Rsi is an upper-bound on the number of type-
s jobs submitted to cloud i in a time slot. The arrival of jobs
3is an ergodic process at each cloud. We suppose the arrival
rate is given, and how a customer decides which cloud to use
is orthogonal to this study. Let psi (t) ∈ [0, p
s(max)
i ] be the
given service charge to the customer by cloud i, for accepting
a job of type s in time slot t, which remains fixed within a
time slot, but may vary across time slots. Here, ps(max)i is the
max possible price for psi (t). Such a general charging model
subsumes pricing schemes in practice: e.g., time-independent
psi (t) corresponds to the on-demand VM charging scheme,
while time-varying psi (t) can represent the spot instance prices
based on the current demand vs. supply [10].
Job scheduling: Each incoming job to cloud i enters a FIFO
queue of its type — a cloud i maintains a queue to buffer
unscheduled jobs of each type s, with Qsi (t) as its length in t.
When the required VMs of a job are allocated, the job departs
from its queue and starts to run on the VMs. A cloud may
schedule its jobs on either its own VMs or VMs leased from
other clouds, for the best economic benefits. Let µsij(t) be
the number of type-s jobs of cloud i that are scheduled for
processing in cloud j at the beginning of time slot t.
When a job’s demanded maximum response time (the SLA)
cannot be met, in cases of system overload, it is dropped.
A penalty is enforced in this case, to compensate for the
customer’s loss. Let
Dsi (t) ∈ [0, D
s(max)
i ] (1)
be the number of type-s jobs dropped by cloud i in t, where
D
s(max)
i is the maximum value of Dsi (t). Let ξsi be the
penalty to drop one such job, which is at least the maximum
price charged to customers when accepting the jobs, i.e.,
ξsi ≥ p
s(max)
i .
Hence, the number of unscheduled jobs buffered at each
cloud i ∈ [1, F ] can be updated with the following queueing
law:
Qsi (t+ 1) =max{Q
s
i (t)−
F∑
j=1
µsij(t)−D
s
i (t), 0}
+ rsi (t), ∀s ∈ [1, S]. (2)
Job scheduling should satisfy the following SLA constraint:
Each type-s job in cloud i is either scheduled or dropped (subject
to a penalty) before its maximum response delay ds, ∀s ∈ [1, S].
(3)
We apply the ǫ−persistence queue technique [15], to create
a virtual queue Zsi associated with each job queue Qsi (∀i ∈
[1, F ]):
Zsi (t+ 1) =max{Z
s
i (t) + 1{Qsi (t)>0} · [ǫs −
F∑
j=1
µsij(t)]−D
s
i (t)
− 1{Qs
i
(t)=0} ·
F∑
j=1
Cmsj ·N
ms
j
gs
, 0}, ∀s ∈ [1, S]. (4)
Here, ǫs > 0 is a constant. 1{Qsi (t)>0} and 1{Qsi (t)=0} are
indicator functions such that
1{Qs
i
(t)>0} =
{
1 if Qsi (t) > 0
0 Otherwise ; 1{Q
s
i
(t)=0} =
{
1 if Qsi (t) = 0
0 Otherwise .
Length of this virtual queue reflects the cumulated response
delay of jobs from the respective job queue. Our algorithm
seeks to bound the lengths of job queues and virtual queues,
with properly set ǫs, and hence the maximum response delay
of jobs can be bounded, i.e., constraint (3) is satisfied.
Server provisioning: We consider electricity cost, for running
and cooling the servers [16], as the main component of the
operational cost in a cloud. Other costs, e.g., space rental and
labour, remain relatively fixed for a long time, and are of less
interest. Given that electricity prices vary at different locations
and from time to time [3] [17], we model the operational cost
βi(t) in each cloud i as a general ergodic process over time,
varying across time slots between β(min)i and β
(max)
i .
Each cloud strategically decides the number of active
servers at each time, to optimize its profit. Let nmi (t) be the
number of active servers provisioning type-m VMs at cloud i
in t. The available server capacities at each cloud i ∈ [1, F ]
constrain the feasible job scheduling at time t:∑
j∈[1,F ]
∑
s:ms=m,s∈[1,S]
gsµ
s
ji(t) ≤ C
m
i · n
m
i (t), ∀m ∈ [1,M ], (5)
nmi (t) ≤ N
m
i , ∀m ∈ [1,M ]. (6)
(5) states that the overall demand for type-m VMs in cloud
i from itself and other clouds should be no larger than the
maximum number of available type-m VMs on the active
servers in cloud i. Here gsµsji(t) is the total number of VMs
needed by type-s jobs scheduled from cloud j to cloud i in
t. Motivated by practical job execution efficiency, we only
consider scheduling a job to VMs from a single cloud, but
not VMs across different clouds. (6) ensures that the number
of active servers is limited by the total number of on-premise
servers of the corresponding VM configuration at each cloud.
B. Inter-cloud VM Trading with Double Auction
In an inter-cloud resource market, VMs constitute the items
for trading. For each type of VMs, multiple clouds may have
them on sale while multiple other clouds can request them. A
double auction is a natural fit to implement efficient trading in
this case, allowing both selling and buying clouds to actively
participate in pricing, on behalf of their own benefits. In our
dynamic system, a multi-unit double auction is carried out
among the clouds at the beginning of each time slot, deciding
the VM trades within that time slot.
Buyers & Sellers: A cloud can be both a buyer and a seller.
A buy-bid < bmi (t), γmi (t) > records the unit price and
maximum quantity at which cloud i is willing to buy VMs of
type m, in t. Similarly, a sell-bid < smi (t), ηmi (t) > records the
unit price and maximum quantity at which cloud i is willing
to sell VMs of type m in t.
Let b˜mi (t) and s˜mi (t) be cloud i’s true valuation of buying
and selling a type-m VM respectively (the max/min price it is
willing to pay/accept). Similarly, let γ˜mi (t) and η˜mi (t) be cloud
i’s true valuation of the quantity to buy and sell VMs of type
m respectively (the maximum volume of VMs it is willing to
purchase/sell). A cloud i may strategically manipulate the bid
prices and volumes, in the hope of maximizing its profit. We
show in Sec. VII that the double auction proposed in Sec. IV
is truthful, such that each bid price reveals the true valuation.
Auctioneer: We assume that there is a broker in the cloud
federation, assuming the role of the auctioneer. After collecting
4TABLE I
NOTATION: INPUT QUANTITIES AND INTERMEDIATE VARIABLES
F # of clouds S # of service types
M # of VM types ms VM type of service type s
ds Max. response delay of
service type s
gs # of VMs required by ser-
vice type s
rsi (t) # of type-s jobs arrived at cloud i, slot t
Rsi Max. # of type-s jobs arrived at cloud i per slot
psi (t) Service price for each job of type s at cloud i, slot t
p
s(max)
i Max. service price for each type-s job at cloud i per slot
βi(t) Cost for operating an active server at cloud i, slot t
β
(min)
i Min. cost for operating an active server at cloud i per slot
β
(max)
i Max. cost for operating an active server at cloud i per slot
ξsi Penalty for dropping a type-s job at cloud i
D
s(max)
i Max. # of type-s jobs cloud i drops per slot
Cmi Max. # of type-m VMs an active server at cloud i provisions
Nmi Total # of servers provisioning type-m VMs at cloud i
Qsi (t) Length of queue buffering type-s jobs at cloud i, slot t
Zsi (t) Length of virtual queue of type-s jobs at cloud i, slot t
ǫs Constant positive parameter for Zsi (t), ∀i ∈ [1, F ]
Q
s(max)
i Maximum length of queue Qsi (t)
Z
s(max)
i Maximum length of virtual queue Z
s
i (t)
V User-defined constant positive parameter for dynamic algorithm
all the buy and sell bids, the auctioneer executes a double
auction to be detailed in Sec. V, to decide the set of successful
buy and sell bids, their clearing prices and the numbers of
VMs to trade in each type. Let bˆmi (t) be the actual charge
price for cloud i to buy one type-m VM, and γˆmi (t) be the
actual number of VMs purchased. Similarly, let sˆmi (t) be the
actual income cloud i receives for selling one type-m VM,
and ηˆmi (t) be the actual number of VMs sold.
Let αmij (t) be the number of type-m VMs that cloud i ∈
[1, F ] purchases from cloud j ∈ [1, F ] in t, as decided by the
auctioneer:
γˆmi (t) =
∑
j∈[1,F ],j 6=i
αmij (t), ∀m ∈ [1,M ], (7)
ηˆmi (t) =
∑
j∈[1,F ],j 6=i
αmji(t), ∀m ∈ [1,M ]. (8)
Since VMs are purchased for serving jobs, the job schedul-
ing decisions µsij(t) at each cloud i ∈ [1, F ], are related to the
number of VMs it purchases:∑
s:s∈[1,S],ms=m
gs·µ
s
ij(t) = α
m
ij (t),
∀m ∈ [1,M ], ∀i, j ∈ [1, F ], i 6= j. (9)
Three economic properties are desirable for the auctioneer’s
mechanism. (i) Truthfulness: Bidding true valuations is a
dominant strategy, and consequently, both bidder strategies
and auction design are simplified. (ii) Individual Rationality:
Each cloud obtains a non-negative profit by participating in
the auction. (iii) Ex-post Budget Balance: The auctioneer has
a non-negative surplus, i.e., the total payment from all winning
buy-bids is no less than the total charge for all winning sell-
bids in each time slot.
C. Individual Selfishness
Each cloud in the federation aims to maximize its time-
averaged profit (revenue minus cost) over the long run of
the system, while striking to fulfill the resource and SLA
requirements of each job.
TABLE II
NOTATION: DECISION VARIABLES AT INDIVIDUAL CLOUDS
µsij(t) # of type-s jobs scheduled from cloud i to cloud j, slot t
nmi (t) # of active servers providing type-m VMs at cloud i, slot t
Dsi (t) # of dropped type-s jobs at cloud i, slot t
s˜mi (t) True value of selling one type-m VM from cloud i, slot t
η˜mi (t) True value of volume to sell type-m VMs from cloud i, slot t
smi (t) Bid price for selling one type-m VM from cloud i, slot t
ηmi (t) Max. # of type-m VMs cloud i can sell, slot t
b˜mi (t) True value of buying one type-m VM by cloud i, slot t
γ˜mi (t) True value of volume to buy type-m VMs by cloud i, slot t
bmi (t) Bid price for buying one type-m VM by cloud i, slot t
γmi (t) Max. # of type-m VMs cloud i can buy, slot t
TABLE III
NOTATION: DECISION VARIABLES AT THE AUCTIONEER
sˆmi (t) Actual price of selling one type-m VM from cloud i, slot t
ηˆmi (t) Actual # of type-m VMs sold from cloud i, slot t
bˆmi (t) Actual price of buying one type-m VM by cloud i, slot t
γˆmi (t) Actual # of type-m VMs bought by cloud i, slot t
αmij (t) Actual # of type-m VMs sold from cloud j to i, slot t
θmj (t) The jth highest buy-bid price for type-m VMs at auctioneer
ϑmj (t) The jth lowest sell-bid price for type-m VMs at auctioneer
Lmj (t) Max. # of type-m VMs to sell, in sell-bid with jth lowest price
at auctioneer in t
Revenue: A cloud has two sources of revenue: i) job service
charges paid by its customers, and ii) the proceeds from VM
sales. The time-averaged revenue of cloud i ∈ [1, F ] by
undertaking different types of jobs from its customers is
Φi1 = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
∑
s∈[1,S]
E{psi (t) · r
s
i (t)}. (10)
We assume the front-end charges, psi (t), from a cloud to its
customers, are given. Hence, this part of the revenue is fixed in
each time slot. The time-averaged income of cloud i ∈ [1, F ]
from selling VMs to other clouds is:
Φi2 = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
∑
m∈[1,M]
E{sˆmi (t) · ηˆ
m
i (t)}. (11)
Cloud i can control this income by adjusting its sell-bids, i.e.,
smi (t) and ηmi (t), ∀m ∈ [1,M ], at each time.
Cost: The cost of cloud i consists of three parts: i) operational
costs incurred for running its active servers, ii) the penalties for
dropping jobs, and iii) the expenditure on buying VMs from
other clouds. The time-averaged cost for operating servers at
each cloud i ∈ [1, F ] is decided by the number of active
servers in each time, i.e.,
Ψi1 = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E{βi(t) ·
M∑
m=1
nmi (t)}. (12)
The time-averaged penalty at each cloud i ∈ [1, F ] is
determined by the number of dropped jobs over time, i.e.,
Dsi (t), ∀s ∈ [1, S], t ∈ [0, T − 1]:
Ψi2 = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
∑
s∈[1,S]
E{ξsi ·D
s
i (t)}. (13)
The time-averaged expenditure for VM purchases is decided
by the actual VM trading prices and numbers, as decided by
the buy-bids (bmi (t), γmi (t)) from cloud i ∈ [1, F ]:
Ψi3 = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E{
M∑
m=1
bˆmi (t) · γˆ
m
i (t)}. (14)
5Profit Maximization: The profit maximization problem at
cloud i ∈ [1, F ] can be formulated as follows:
max Φi1 +Φ
i
2 −Ψ
i
1 −Ψ
i
2 −Ψ
i
3 (15)
s.t. Constraints (1)-(9).
D. Social Welfare
Social welfare is the overall profit of the cloud federation:∑
i∈[1,F ]
(Φi1 +Φ
i
2 −Ψ
i
1 −Ψ
i
2 −Ψ
i
3).
Since the income and expenditure due to VM trades among
the clouds cancel each other, the formula above equals∑
i∈[1,F ](Φ
i
1 − Ψ
i
1 − Ψ
i
2). The social welfare maximization
problem is:
max
∑
i∈[1,F ]
(Φi1 −Ψ
i
1 −Ψ
i
2) (16)
s.t. Constraints (1)-(6), ∀i ∈ [1, F ]
which globally optimizes server provisioning and job schedul-
ing in the federation and maximally serves all the incoming
jobs at the minimum cost, regardless of the specific inter-cloud
VM trading mechanism.
When a double auction mechanism is truthful, individual ra-
tional and ex-post budget balancing, it is shown that efficiency
in terms of social welfare maximization cannot be achieved
concurrently [18]. We hence make a necessary compromise in
social welfare in our auction design, i.e., the sum of maximal
individual profits derived by (15) will be smaller than the
optimal social welfare from (16). Nevertheless, we will show
in Sec. VII and Sec. VIII that our mechanisms still manages
to achieve a satisfactory social welfare in the long run.
Tables I, II and III summarize important notation in the
paper, for ease of reference.
IV. DYNAMIC INDIVIDUAL-PROFIT MAXIMIZATION
ALGORITHM
We next present a dynamic algorithm for each cloud to
trade VMs and scheduling jobs/servers, which is in fact
applicable under any truthful, individual-rational and ex-post
budget balanced double auction mechanism. We will also tailor
a double auction mechanism on the auctioneer in the next
section. Fig. 1 illustrates the relation among these algorithm
modules.
Fig. 1. Key algorithm modules.
The goal of the dynamic algorithm at each cloud i is to max-
imize its time-averaged profit, i.e., to solve optimization (15),
by dynamically making decisions in each time slot. We apply
the drift-plus-penalty framework in Lyapunov optimization
theory [19], and derive a one-shot optimization problem to be
solved by cloud i in each time slot t as follows. We will prove
in Sec. VII that by optimally solving the one-shot optimization
at each cloud during each time slot, the dynamic algorithm can
achieve a time-averaged individual profit arbitrarily close to its
offline optimum (computed with complete knowledge in the
entire time span), for each cloud.
A. The One-shot Optimization Problem
Define the set of queues at cloud i in each time slot t as
Θi(t) = {Q
s
i (t), Z
s
i (t)|s ∈ [1, S]}.
Define the Lyapunov function as follows:
L(Θi(t)) =
1
2
∑
s∈[1,S]
[(Qsi (t))
2 + (Zsi (t))
2].
Then the one-slot conditional Lyapunov drift [19] is
∆(Θi(t)) = L(Θi(t+ 1))− L(Θi(t)).
Squaring the queuing laws (2) and (4), we can derive the
following inequality (details can be found in Appendix A):
∆(Θi(t))− V · [
∑
m∈[1,M]
[sˆmi (t)ηˆ
m
i (t)− bˆ
m
i (t)γˆ
m
i (t)− βi(t)n
m
i (t)]
+
∑
s∈[1,S]
[psi (t) · r
s
i (t)−D
s
i (t)ξ
s
i ]]
≤Bi +
∑
s∈[1,S]
[Qsi (t)r
s
i (t) + Z
s
i (t)ǫs − V p
s
i (t) · r
s
i (t)]
− ϕi1(t)− ϕ
i
2(t)− ϕ
i
3(t), (17)
where V > 0 is a user-defined positive parameter for
gauging the optimality of time-averaged profit, Bi =
1
2
∑
s∈[1,S][(
∑F
j=1 C
ms
j N
ms
j /gs + D
s(max)
i )
2 + (Rsi )
2 + (ǫs)
2 +
(D
s(max)
i +
∑F
j=1 C
ms
j N
ms
j /gs)
2] is a constant, and
ϕi1(t) = V
∑
m∈[1,M]
[sˆmi (t)ηˆ
m
i (t)− bˆ
m
i (t)γˆ
m
i (t)− βi(t)n
m
i (t)],
ϕi2(t) =
∑
s=∈[1,S]
∑
j∈[1,F ]
µsij(t)[Q
s
i (t) + Z
s
i (t)],
ϕi3(t) =
∑
s∈[1,S]
Dsi (t)[Q
s
i (t) + Z
s
i (t)− V · ξ
s
i ].
Based on the drift-plus-penalty framework [19], a dynamic
algorithm can be derived for each cloud i, which observes the
job and virtual queues (Θi(t)), job arrival rates (rsi (t), ∀s ∈
[1, S]), the current cost for server operation (βi(t)) in each time
slot, and minimizes the RHS of the inequality (17), such that a
lower bound for time-averaged profit of cloud i is maximized.
Note that Bi+
∑
s∈[1,S][Q
s
i (t)r
s
i (t)+Z
s
i (t)ǫs−V p
s
i (t) ·r
s
i (t)]
in the RHS of (17) is fixed in time slot t. Hence, to maximize
a lower bound of the time-averaged profit for cloud i, the
dynamic algorithm should solve the one-shot optimization
problem in each time slot t as follows:
max ϕi1(t) + ϕ
i
2(t) + ϕ
i
3(t) (18)
s.t. Constraints (1), (5)-(9).
The maximization problem in (18) can be decoupled into
two independent optimization problems:
max ϕi1(t) + ϕ
i
2(t) s.t. Constraints (5)-(9), (19)
which is related to optimal decisions on i) buy/sell bids for
different types of VMs, and ii) scheduling of active servers
and jobs to these servers; and
max ϕi3(t) s.t. Constraint (1), (20)
which is related to optimal decisions on iii) jobs to drop.
In the following, we design algorithms to derive the optimal
decisions based on problem (19) and problem (20).
6B. VM Valuation and Bid
Optimization problem (19) is related to the actual charges
that cloud i pays for each type of VMs purchased, bˆmi (t) and
sˆmi (t) (∀m ∈ [1,M ]), and the actual numbers of traded VMs,
γˆmi (t) and ηˆmi (t) (∀m ∈ [1,M ]), from the double auction.
These values are determined by the auctioneer according to
buy-bids (bmi (t), γmi (t)) and sell-bids (smi (t), ηmi (t)) submit-
ted by all clouds, and its double auction mechanism. That
is, each cloud i first proposes its buy-bids and sell-bids to
the auctioneer, and then receives the auction results, based on
which the job scheduling and server provisioning decisions are
made. We first investigate how each cloud proposes its buy-
bids and sell-bids, and then decide optimal job scheduling and
server provisioning in Sec. IV-C.
A truthful double auction is employed at the auctioneer,
where sellers and buyers bid their true values of the prices
and quantities, in order to maximize their individual utilities.
(19) is the utility maximization problem for each cloud. If we
can find true values of each cloud i, b˜mi (t), γ˜mi (t), s˜mi (t) and
η˜mi (t), and let the cloud bid using these values, the achieved
utility in (19) is guaranteed to be the largest, as compared to
bidding any other values.
We decide the true values of the bids for each cloud i,
according to their definitions in double auctions [8] [9]. The
true value of the price to buy (sell) a type-m VM, b˜mi (t)
(s˜mi (t)), is such a value that, if a VM is purchased (sold) at a
price (i) equal to this value, then cloud i’s profit remains the
same, compared to not obtaining the VM; (ii) higher than this
value, a profit loss (gain) at cloud i occurs; and (iii) lower than
this value, a profit gain (loss) results. In a multi-unit double
auction, the true value of the maximum number of type-m
VMs cloud i can buy (sell), γ˜mi (t) (η˜mi (t)), is the maximum
number of type-m VMs the cloud is willing to buy (sell) at
the true value of the price, i.e., b˜mi (t) (s˜mi (t)).
Using the above rationale and based on problem (19), the
true values of the buy/sell prices for cloud i can be derived as
(detailed derivation steps are given in Appendix B)
b˜mi (t) =
Q
s∗m
i (t) + Z
s∗m
i (t)
V · gs∗m
, (21)
and
s˜mi (t) =


Q
s∗m
i
(t)+Z
s∗m
i
(t)
V ·gs∗m
if Q
s∗m
i
(t)+Z
s∗m
i
(t)
V ·gs∗m
> βi(t)/C
m
i
βi(t)/C
m
i Otherwise
,
(22)
respectively, where
s∗m = arg max
s′∈[1,S],ms′=m
{W s
′
i (t)}, (23)
and W s
′
i (t) =
Qs
′
i (t) + Z
s′
i (t)
gs′
. (24)
Here, W s
′
i (t) denotes the weight for scheduling one type-s′
job (to run on type-ms′ VM(s)) by cloud i in t, and s∗m
specifies the job type with the largest weight (ties broken
arbitrarily), among all types of jobs requiring type-m VMs.
W s
′
i (t) is determined by the following factors: (i) the sum
of queue backlogs, Qs′i (t) + Zs
′
i (t), representing the level
of urgency for scheduling type-s′ jobs in t, since Qs′i (t) is
the number of unscheduled type-s′ jobs and Zs′i (t) reflects
the cumulated response delay; (ii) the number of concurrent
VMs each type-s′ job requires, gs′ , which decides the job-
scheduling difficulty.
The intuition behind (21) and (22) includes: (i) the true
value of the price to buy a type-m VM depends on the
combined effect of urgency and difficulty for scheduling jobs
requiring this type of VMs, and is computed based on the
maximum weight that any type of jobs requiring type-m VMs
may achieve; (ii) the true value of the price to sell one type-m
VM from cloud i is the same as that of the price to buy, if
the latter exceeds the current cost of operating a type-m VM
in the cloud; otherwise, it is set to the operational cost.
The true values of the number of type-m VMs to buy and
to sell at cloud i are
γ˜mi (t) =
∑
j∈[1,F ]
Cmi ·N
m
i , (25)
and η˜mi (t) = Cmi ·Nmi , (26)
respectively. They state that the maximum number of type-
m VMs cloud i is willing to buy (sell) at the price in (21)
(in (22)), is the number of all potential type-m VMs in the
federation. The rationale is as follows: The clearing price for
transactions of type-m VMs in the double auction is at most
the buyer’s true value in (21) and at least the seller’s true value
in (22), if the corresponding buy/sell bids are successful. By
definition of the true value, if the actual charge per VM is
lower (higher) than the true value, a profit gain happens at the
buyer (seller), and the more VMs purchased (sold), the larger
the profit gain. Therefore, a cloud is willing to buy or sell at
the largest quantity possible, for profit maximization.1
To conclude, in each time slot t, cloud i submits its bids as
bmi (t) = b˜
m
i (t), s
m
i (t) = s˜
m
i (t), γ
m
i (t) = γ˜
m
i (t) and ηmi (t) =
η˜mi (t), for each type of VMs m ∈ [1,M ].
C. Server Provisioning, Job scheduling and Dropping
After receiving results of the double auction (actual charges
bˆmi (t), sˆ
m
i (t), ∀m ∈ [1,M ], and the actual numbers of traded
VMs γˆmi (t), ηˆmi (t), ∀m ∈ [1,M ], α
ms
ji (t), ∀s ∈ [1, S], ∀j ∈
[1, F ]), cloud i schedules its jobs on its local servers and
(potentially) purchased VMs from other clouds, decides job
drops and the number of active servers to provision, by solving
optimization problems (19) and (20).
1) Server provisioning: We start with deriving nmi (t),
∀m ∈ [1,M ], by assuming known values of sˆmi (t), ηˆmi (t),
bˆmi (t), γˆ
m
i (t), α
m
ij (t) and µsij(t) (we will present the value of
nmi (t) in terms of these variables). In this case, problem (19)
is equivalent to the following minimization problem:
min V βi(t)
∑
m∈[1,M]
nmi (t)
s.t. Constraint (5), (6) and (9).
1It may appear counter-intuitive that a cloud is willing to buy all type-
m VMs in the federation, regardless of its number of unscheduled jobs
requiring type-m VMs, i.e.,
∑
s∈[1,S],ms=m
Qsi (t). Interestingly, our proof
in Sec. VII shows that bidding so in each time slot can achieve a time-
averaged profit over the long run that approximates the offline optimum,
and our simulation in Sec. VIII shows that it performs better as compared
to a bidding strategy that asks for the exact number of VMs to serve the
unscheduled jobs.
7Since V βi(t) ≥ 0, the best strategy is to assign the minimal
feasible value to nmi (t), ∀m ∈ [1,M ], that satisfies constraints
(5) and (9), which can be combined into∑
s∈[1,S],ms=m
µsii(t) · gs +
∑
j 6=i
αmji(t) ≤ C
m
i n
m
i (t).
Hence, the optimal number of activated servers at cloud i to
provision type-m VM can be calculated as
nmi (t) = (
∑
s∈[1,S],ms=m
µsii(t) · gs +
∑
j 6=i
αmji(t))/C
m
i . (27)
These many servers can provide enough type-m VMs for
serving local jobs and selling to other clouds.
2) Job scheduling: We now derive µsij(t), ∀j ∈ [1, F ],
s ∈ [1, S], by assuming known values of sˆmi (t), ηˆmi (t), bˆmi (t),
γˆmi (t) and αmij (t), with nmi (t) given in Eqn. (27). Problem
(19) is equivalent to the following maximization problem:
max
∑
s∈[1,S]
∑
j∈[1,F ]
µsij(t)[Q
s
i (t) + Z
s
i (t)]
− V βi
∑
s∈[1,S],ms=m
µsii(t) ·
gs
Cmi
s.t. Constraint (5), (6) and (9).
This is a maximum-weight scheduling problem, with
Qsi (t)+Z
s
i (t) as the per-job scheduling weight for each µsij(t)
(j 6= i) and Qsi (t)+Zsi (t)− V βi(t)gsCm
i
as the per-job scheduling
weight for each µsii(t). There are two cases:
⊲ j = i: In this case, by combining constraints (5), (6) and
(9), we have ∑
s:ms=m,s∈[1,S]
gsµ
s
ii(t) ≤ C
m
i N
m
i −
∑
j 6=i
αmji(t).
Based on the above maximum-weight problem, we know
that the best strategy is to assign all the remaining type-ms
VMs in cloud i, Cmsi n
ms
i (t) −
∑
j 6=i α
ms
ji (t) (the maximum
number of on-premise type-ms VMs minus those sold to other
clouds), to serve its own jobs of service type s∗ms with the
largest per-VM scheduling weight Q
s
i (t)+Z
s
i (t)
gs
− V βi(t)
C
ms
i
if it is
positive (equivalently, the largest Qsi (t)+Zsi (t)
gs
if Q
s
i (t)+Z
s
i (t)
gs
>
V βi(t)
C
ms
i
), among all job types requiring type-ms VMs. Other-
wise, cloud i does not serve any jobs using its own servers
in t. Hence, we derive the optimal number of cloud i’s type-s
jobs scheduled to run on the cloud’s local servers as
µsii(t) =


C
ms
i
·N
ms
i
−
∑
j 6=i α
ms
ji
(t)
gs
if Q
s
i (t)+Z
s
i (t)
·gs
> V βi(t)
C
ms
i
and s = s∗ms
0 Otherwise
.
(28)
⊲ j 6= i: µsij(t) can be directly derived by α
ms
ij (t), which is
the number of type-ms VMs cloud i purchased from cloud j
(constraint (5) is satisfied by our server provisioning decision
in Eqn. (27), and constraint (6) is met by Eqn. (28) and
(27)), based on constraint (9). Similar to the previous case, we
know that the best strategy is to assign all the type-ms VMs
purchased, αmsij (t), to serve jobs of service type s∗ms with the
largest per-VM scheduling weight Q
s
i (t)+Z
s
i (t)
gs
, as defined in
Eqn. (23) and (24). Hence, we derive the optimal solution to
the number of type-s jobs to run at cloud j(6= i) as
µsij(t) =
{
αmsij (t)/gs if s = s∗ms
0 Otherwise . (29)
3) Job dropping: Problem (20) is a maximum-weight prob-
lem with weight Qsi (t) + Zsi (t) − V · ξsi for job-dropping
decision variable Dsi (t), ∀s ∈ [1, S], in the objective function.
If the weight Qsi (t) + Zsi (t) − V · ξsi > 0 (i.e., if the
level of urgency for scheduling type-s jobs Qsi (t) + Zsi (t)
exceeds the weighted job-drop penalty V · ξsi ), type-s jobs
in queue Qsi should be dropped at the maximum rate, i.e.,
Dsi (t) = D
s(max)
i , in order to maximize the objective function
value; otherwise, there is no drop, i.e., Dsi (t) = 0. Therefore,
the optimal number of type-s jobs dropped by cloud i in t is
Dsi (t) =
{
D
s(max)
i if Qsi (t) + Zsi (t) > V · ξsi
0 Otherwise
. (30)
In the above results, we note that the derived job scheduling
and drop numbers do not need to be bounded by the number
of unscheduled jobs in the corresponding job queue, i.e.,
µsij(t) and Dsi (t) are not required to be bounded by Qsi (t)
according to Eqn. (2). Nevertheless, the actual number of
jobs to schedule/drop when running the algorithm, is upper
bounded by the length of the job queue.
D. The Dynamic Algorithm
Alg. 1 summarizes the dynamic algorithm for each cloud
to carry out in each time slot, in order to maximize its time-
averaged profit over the long run.
Algorithm 1 Dynamic Profit Maximization Algorithm at cloud
i in Time Slot t
Input: rsi (t), Qsi (t), Zsi (t), gs, ms, ξsi , Cmi , Nmi and βi(t), ∀s ∈
[1, S].
Output: bmi (t), smi (t), γmi (t), ηmi (t), Dsi (t), µsij(t) and nmi (t),
∀m ∈ [1,M ], s ∈ [1, S], j ∈ [1, F ].
1: VM valuation and bid: Decide bmi (t), smi (t), γmi (t) and ηmi (t)
with Eqn. (21)-(26);
2: Server provisioning, job scheduling and dropping: Decide
µsij(t), D
s
i (t) and nmi (t) with Eqn. (29), (28), (30) and (27);
3: Update Qsi (t) and Zsi (t) with Eqn. (2) and (4).
We analyze the computation and communication complex-
ities of Alg. 1 as follows.
Computation complexity: We study the computation com-
plexity for each algorithm module respectively.
⊲ VM valuation and bid: The algorithm should first calculate
the value of s∗m for each VM type m ∈ [1,M ] with Eqn. (23)
by comparing the weights W s′i (t) among different types of
jobs. In fact, the weight for each job type s ∈ [1, S] is only
evaluated once since it is only involved in the calculation of
s∗m where m = ms. Hence, the computation overhead to find
s∗m, ∀m ∈ [1,M ], is O(S). Based on the value of s∗m, the
buy/sell bids of type-m VMs can be decided by Eqn. (21)-
(26) in constant time. For all M VM types, the computation
overhead is O(M). Hence, the overall computation complexity
for this algorithm module is O(S +M).
⊲ Server provisioning, job scheduling and dropping: With
s∗m, ∀m ∈ [1,M ], calculated in the above algorithm module,
we can directly know the value of s∗ms , ∀s ∈ [1, S]. Then,
the job scheduling decision µsij(t) for job type s can be made
8in constant time based on Eqn. (29) and (28). For all S job
types, the computation overhead is O(S).
The server provisioning decisions can be found in constant
time based on the job scheduling decisions and the auction
results, according to Eqn. (27) for type-m VMs. For all M
VM types, the computation overhead is O(M).
Job dropping is also decided in constant time for type-s
jobs based on Eqn. (30). For all S job types, the computation
complexity is O(S).
⊲ Queue update: For each job type s, the job queue Qsi (t) and
virtual queue Zsi (t) can be updated in constant time based on
Eqn. (2) and (4). Hence, for all S job types, the computation
overhead is O(S).
In summary, the computation complexity of Alg. 1 is O(S+
M).
Communication complexity: The input to Alg. 1 is mostly
derived from local information. There is no direct information
exchange among individual clouds. The only communication
overhead is incurred when a cloud sends its VM bids to the
auctioneer and receives the auction results for each VM type.
Since there are M VM types, the communication complexity
is O(M) for each cloud.
V. DOUBLE AUCTION MECHANISM
We next design a double auction mechanism for inter-cloud
VM trading, which not only is truthful, individual rational and
ex-post budget balanced, but also can enable satisfactory social
welfare (Theorems 2-4 and 8, Sec. VII).
The true values of buy and sell bids at each participating
cloud (Eqn. (21)-(26)) are not related to the detailed auction
mechanism. The true values of the maximum numbers of VMs
a cloud is willing to trade (γˆmi (t) and ηˆmi (t) in (25) and
(26)) are time-independent constants determined by system
parameters Cmi and Nmi . These parameters, and thus γˆmi (t)
and ηˆmi (t), are easily known to other clouds, and hence it
is not meaningful for a buyer/seller to bid otherwise. We
correspondingly design a double auction where γmi (t) in each
buy-bid is fixed to the value in (25) and ηmi (t) in each sell-bid
is always the value in (26), while the buy/sell prices, bmi (t)’s
and smi (t)’s, can be decided by the respective buyers/sellers.
The following mechanism is carried out by the auctioneer at
the beginning of each time slot t, to decide the actual trading
price and number for each type of VMs m ∈ [1,M ].
1. Winner Determination: The auctioneer sorts all received
buy-bids for type-m VMs in descending order in the buy
prices. Let θmj (t) be the jth highest. Two buy-bids with the
largest and second largest prices, θm1 (t), θm2 (t), are identified
(ties broken arbitrarily). The sell-bids for type-m VMs are
sorted in ascending order in the sell prices. Let ϑmj (t) be the
jth lowest, with Lmj (t) as the corresponding maximum num-
ber of VMs to sell, such that ϑm1 (t) ≤ ϑm2 (t) ≤ . . . ≤ ϑmN (t).
Let j′ be the critical index in the sorted sequence of sell-bids,
such that ϑmj′ (t) is the largest sell price not exceeding θm2 (t),
i.e.,
ϑmj′ (t) ≤ θ
m
2 (t), and ϑmj′+1(t) > θm2 (t). (31)
If there are at least two sell-bids ϑm1 (t) and ϑm2 (t) no higher
than the second largest buy price θm2 (t), the highest buy-bid
θm1 (t) wins, and the sell-bids with the lowest to the (j′ − 1)
th
lowest sell prices (ϑmj (t) ≤ ϑmj′ (t), not including j′) win.
Otherwise, no buy/sell bid wins.
2. Pricing and Allocation: It is a NP-hard problem to clear
the double auction market with discriminatory prices [20]. We
apply a uniform clearing price to winning buy/sell bids of
type-m VMs, as follows.
⊲ The price charged to each buyer cloud i of type-m VMs is
bˆmi (t) =
{
θm2 (t) if bid bmi (t) wins,
0 otherwise. (32)
⊲ The price paid to each seller cloud i of type-m VMs is
sˆmi (t) =
{
ϑmj′ (t) if bid smi (t) wins,
0 otherwise.
(33)
⊲ The number of type-m VMs bought by cloud i is
γˆmi (t) =
{∑j′−1
j=1 L
m
j (t) if bid bmi (t) wins,
0 otherwise.
(34)
⊲ The number of type-m VMs sold by cloud i is
ηˆmi (t) =
{
ηmi (t) if bid smi (t) wins,
0 otherwise. (35)
⊲ The number of type-m VMs sold from cloud j to cloud i is
αmij (t) =
{
ηmj (t) if bids bmi (t) and smj (t) win,
0 otherwise. (36)
For example, consider a federation of 4 clouds with buy
and sell prices bid in Table IV, each seeking to buy/sell one
VM. Clouds 2 and 3 bid the two largest buy prices $20 and
$15, which are higher than sell prices from clouds 1 and 4.
Hence the buyer cloud 2 and the seller cloud 4 win, while the
clearing buy and sell prices are $15 and $13, respectively.
TABLE IV
DOUBLE AUCTION BIDS: AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
Cloud 1 Cloud 2 Cloud 3 Cloud 4
Buy-bid $10 $20 $15 $8
Sell-bid $13 $22 $16 $9
VI. DYNAMIC SOCIAL-WELFARE MAXIMIZATION
ALGORITHM: A BENCHMARK
We also present a dynamic algorithm that maximizes the
time-averaged social welfare in the federation (optimization
problem (16)), and its derivation steps based on the Lyapunov
optimization framework. This algorithm is used as a bench-
mark to examine the efficiency of Alg. 1 in social welfare.
A. Derivation Details
Similar to the derivation of Alg. 1, we first derive a one-shot
optimization problem (40) for the federation to solve based on
the drift-plus-penalty framework of Lyapunov optimization,
and then derive the dynamic benchmark algorithm to solve
it optimally in each time slot.
In each time slot t, define the set of queues Θ(t) in the
federation as
Θ(t) = {Qsi (t), Z
s
i (t)|i ∈ [1, F ], s ∈ [1, S]}.
Define the Lyapunov function as follows:
L(Θ(t)) =
1
2
∑
i∈[1,F ]
∑
s∈[1,S]
[(Qsi (t))
2 + (Zsi (t))
2].
9Then the one-slot conditional Lyapunov drift is
∆(Θ(t)) = L(Θ(t+ 1))− L(Θ(t)).
Squaring the queuing laws Eqn. (2) and (4), we can derive
the following inequality (details can be found in Appendix C)
∆(Θ(t)) + V ·
∑
i∈[1,F ]
[
∑
m∈[1,M]
[βi(t)n
m
i (t)] +
∑
s∈[1,S]
Dsi (t)ξ
s
i
−
∑
s∈[1,S]
psi (t)r
s
i (t)]
≤B +
∑
i∈[1,F ]
∑
s∈[1,S]
[Qsi (t)r
s
i (t) + Z
s
i (t)ǫs − V p
s
i (t)r
s
i (t)]
− ϕ1(t)− ϕ2(t), (37)
where V > 0 is a user-defined positive parameter for
gauging the optimality of the time-averaged social wel-
fare, B =
∑
i∈[1,F ]Bi is a constant with Bi =
1
2
∑
s∈[1,S][[
∑F
j=1 C
ms
j N
ms
j /gs+D
s(max)
i ]
2+[Rsi ]
2+[ǫs]
2+
[D
s(max)
i +
∑F
j=1 C
ms
j N
ms
j /gs]
2], and
ϕ1(t) =
∑
i∈[1,F ]
[
∑
s∈[1,S]
[Qsi (t) + Z
s
i (t)] ·
∑
j∈[1,F ]
µsij(t)
− V βi(t)
∑
m∈[1,M]
nmi (t)], (38)
ϕ2(t) =
∑
i∈[1,F ]
∑
s∈[1,S]
Dsi (t)[Q
s
i (t) + Z
s
i (t)− V · ξ
s
i ]. (39)
Based on the drift-plus-penalty framework [19], a dynamic
algorithm can be derived for the federation to observe job
and virtual queues Θ(t), job arrival rates (rsi (t), ∀i ∈
[1, F ], s ∈ [1, S]), the current cost for server operation
(βi(t), ∀i ∈ [1, F ]) in each time slot, and minimizes the
RHS of the inequality (37), such that a lower bound for
the time-averaged social welfare is maximized. Note that
B +
∑
i∈[1,F ]
∑
s∈[1,S][Q
s
i (t)r
s
i (t) + Z
s
i (t)ǫs − V p
s
i (t)r
s
i (t)]
in the RHS of (37) is fixed in time slot t. Hence, to maximize
a lower bound of the time-averaged social welfare for the
federation, the dynamic algorithm should solve the one-shot
optimization problem in each time slot t as follows:
max ϕ1(t) + ϕ2(t) (40)
s.t. Constraints (1), (5)-(6), ∀i ∈ [1, F ].
The maximization problem in (40) can be decoupled into
two independent optimization problems:
max ϕ1(t) s.t. Constraint (5)-(6), ∀i ∈ [1, F ], (41)
which is related to decisions on job scheduling and server
provisioning, and
max ϕ2(t) s.t. Constraint (1), ∀i ∈ [1, F ], (42)
which is related to decisions on job dropping. We note that
to maximize social welfare, the decisions that the federation
needs to make are not related to any inter-cloud VM trading
mechanism, since the income and expenditure due to VM
trades among the clouds have canceled each other when
calculating the social welfare. We next solve problem (41)
and problem (42) to derive the optimal decisions.
1) Server provisioning: We start with solving nmi (t), ∀m ∈
[1,M ], i ∈ [1, F ], by assuming known values of job schedul-
ing decisions µsij(t)’s, and present the value of the former in
terms of the latter. In this case, problem (41) is equivalent to
the following minimization problem:
min V
∑
i∈[1,F ]
βi(t)
∑
m∈[1,M]
nmi (t)
s.t. Constraint (5) - (6), ∀i ∈ [1, F ].
Since V βi(t) ≥ 0, the best strategy is to assign the minimal
feasible value to nmi (t), for each VM type m at each cloud
i, that satisfies constraints (5) and (6). Hence, the optimal
number of activated servers at cloud i to provision type-m
VM is
nmi (t) = [
∑
j∈[1,F ]
∑
s∈[1,S],ms=m
µsji(t) · gs]/C
m
i . (43)
2) Job scheduling: We next derive µsij(t), ∀i ∈ [1, F ], j ∈
[1, F ], s ∈ [1, S], with nmi (t) given in Eqn. (43). Problem (41)
is equivalent to the following maximization problem:
max
∑
i∈[1,F ]
∑
s∈[1,S]
∑
j∈[1,F ]
µsij(t) · [Q
s
i (t) + Z
s
i (t)− V βj ·
gs
Cmsj
]
s.t. Constraint (5) - (6), ∀i ∈ [1, F ].
This is a maximum-weight scheduling problem, with
Qsi (t) + Z
s
i (t) −
V βj(t)gs
C
ms
j
as the per-job scheduling weight
for each µsij(t). Combining constraints (5) and (6), we have∑
i∈[1,F ]
∑
s:ms=m,s∈[1,S]
gsµ
s
ij(t) ≤ C
m
j N
m
j , ∀j ∈ [1, F ].
The best strategy is to assign all the type-m VMs in cloud j
at the number of Cmj Nmj to serve jobs of type s´m of cloud i´m
with the maximum per-VM scheduling weight Q
s
i (t)+Z
s
i (t)
gs
−
V βj(t)
C
ms
j
if it is positive (equivalently, the largest Qsi (t)+Zsi (t)
gs
as defined in Eqn. (24) and (23) in Sec. IV if Qsi (t)+Zsi (t)
gs
>
V βj(t)
C
ms
j
), among all job types from all clouds requiring type-
m VMs. Hence, the optimal solution to the number of type-s
jobs of cloud i to run at cloud j is
µsij(t) =


Cmsj ·N
ms
j /gs if
Qsi (t)+Z
s
i (t)
gs
> V βi(t)
C
ms
i
and < i, s >=< i´m, s´m >,
0 Otherwise,
(44)
where
< i´m, s´m >= arg max
i∈[1,F ],s∈[1,S],ms=m
{W si (t)}, (45)
and W si (t) is the weight defined in Eqn. (24).
3) Job dropping: Problem (42) is a maximum-weight prob-
lem with weight Qsi (t) + Zsi (t) − V · ξsi for job-dropping
decision Dsi (t) in the objective function. If Qsi (t) + Zsi (t) −
V · ξsi > 0, type-s jobs at cloud i should be dropped at the
maximum rate; otherwise, there is no drop. Hence, the optimal
number of type-s jobs dropped by cloud i in t is
Dsi (t) =
{
D
(max)
s if Qsi (t) + Zsi (t) > V · ξsi
0 Otherwise.
(46)
B. The Dynamic Benchmark Algorithm
Alg. 2 summarizes the dynamic algorithm for the federation
to carry out (e.g., on a centralized controller) in each time slot,
in order to maximize its time-averaged social welfare over the
long run.
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Algorithm 2 Dynamic Social Welfare Maximization Algo-
rithm in Time Slot t
Input: rsi (t), Qsi (t), Zsi (t), gs, ms, ξsi , Cmi , Nmi and βi(t), ∀i ∈
[1, F ], s ∈ [1, S].
Output: Dsi (t), µsij(t) and nmi (t), ∀i ∈ [1, F ], m ∈ [1,M ], s ∈
[1, S].
1: Job scheduling and server provisioning: Decide µsij(t) and
nmi (t) with Eqn. (44) and (43);
2: Job dropping: Decide Dsi (t) with Eqn. (46);
3: Update Qsi (t) and Zsi (t) with Eqn. (2) and (4).
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We next analyze the performance guarantee provided by
our dynamic individual-profit maximization algorithm and the
double auction mechanism.
A. Properties of the Double Auction Mechanism
Theorem 1 (True Valuation): The VM valuations on buy-
bids, i.e., Eqn. (21) and (25), and sell-bids, i.e., Eqn. (22) and
(26), are true values.
This theorem is proved based on the definition of the true
values and the optimization problem (18) solved in each time
slot by each cloud in Appendix B.
Theorem 2 (Truthfulness): Bidding truthfully is the domi-
nant strategy of each cloud in the double auction in Sec. V,
i.e., no cloud can achieve a higher profit in (18) by bidding
with values other than its true values of the buy and sell bids,
in Eqn. (21)(25)(22)(26).
We prove this theorem by contradiction and show that, in
all cases, no cloud can do better with problem (18) by bidding
untruthfully. Details are in Appendix D.
Theorem 3 (Individual Rationality): No winning
buyer pays more than its buy-bid price, and no
winning seller is paid less than its sell-bid price, i.e.,
bˆmi (t) ≤ b
m
i (t) and sˆmi (t) ≥ smi (t), ∀i ∈ [1, F ],m ∈ [1,M ].
This theorem can be proved based on the winner determi-
nation and pricing schemes in our auction mechanism, with
details in Appendix E. Given that the buy-bid (sell-bid) price
is the true value of the buyer (seller), this theorem implies that
a cloud can receive a non-negative profit gain, if it successfully
sells or buys VMs. Hence, a cloud’s profit obtained in a
federation with potential VM trades with others, is always no
lower than that obtained when operating alone.
Theorem 4 (Ex-post Budget Balance): At the auctioneer,
the total payment collected from the buyers is no smaller than
the overall price paid to the sellers, i.e.,∑
i∈[1,F ]
[ˆbmi (t) · γˆ
m
i (t)− sˆ
m
i (t) · ηˆ
m
i (t)] ≥ 0, ∀m ∈ [1,M ].
This theorem is proved based on Eqn. (31) - (33), with
details in Appendix F.
B. SLA Guarantee
Lemma 1: Let Qs(max)i = V ξsi +Rsi and Z
s(max)
i = V ξ
s
i +
ǫs. If Ds(max)i ≥ max{Rsi , ǫs}, each job queue Qsi (t) and
each virtual queue Zsi (t) are upper-bounded by Q
s(max)
i and
Z
s(max)
i , respectively, in t ∈ [0, T − 1], ∀i ∈ [1, F ], s ∈ [1, S].
This lemma can be proved by analyzing the job drop
decision in (30) and the queue updates in (2)(4). The condition
D
s(max)
i ≥ max{R
s
i , ǫs} ensures that, when the queue lengths
grow to satisfy the job drop condition, any further increase
on the queues, e.g., Rsi and ǫs, can be balanced by dropping
enough number of jobs at the rate of Ds(max)i . Detailed proof
is included in Appendix G.
Theorem 5 (SLA Guarantee): Each job of type s ∈ [1, S] is
either scheduled or dropped with Alg. 1 before its maximum
response delay ds, if we set ǫs = Q
s(max)
i +Z
s(max)
i
ds
.
This theorem can be proved based on Lemma 1 and the
ǫ-persistence queue techniques [15]. The condition on ǫs is
to ensure that the queue lengths can grow to satisfy the job
drop condition, i.e., Qsi + Zsi (t) > V ξsi , if some jobs remain
unscheduled in the last ds slots. Note that a cloud only drops
jobs strategically, to balance the loss due to the job drop
penalties and the gain in saving VMs for other jobs. For more
details, please refer to Appendix H.
C. Optimality of Individual Profit and Social Welfare
Theorem 6 (Individual Profit Optimality): Let Ω∗i be the
offline optimum of time-averaged profit of cloud i ∈ [1, F ],
obtained in a truthful, individual-rational, ex-post budget-
balanced double auction, with complete information on its own
job arrivals and prices in the entire time span [0, T − 1]. The
dynamic Algorithm 1 can achieve a time-averaged profit Ωi
for cloud i within a constant gap Bi/V to Ω∗i , i.e.,
Ωi ≥ Ω
∗
i −Bi/V,
where V > 0 and Bi = 12
∑
s∈[1,S][[
∑F
j=1 C
ms
j N
ms
j /gs +
D
s(max)
i ]
2 + [Rsi ]
2 + [ǫs]
2 + [D
s(max)
i +
∑F
j=1 C
ms
j N
ms
j /gs]
2] is
a constant.
The proof to this theorem is rooted in the Lyapunov op-
timization theory [19]. The gap Bi/V can be close to zero
by fixing ǫs and increasing V . Detailed proof is included in
Appendix I.
Theorem 7 (Social Welfare Optimality of Alg. 2): Let Π∗
be the offline optimum of the time-averaged social welfare in
(16), obtained with full information of the federation over the
entire time span [0, T − 1]. The time-averaged social welfare
achieved by all clouds by running Alg. 2, approaches the
offline-optimal social welfare Π∗, by a constant gap B/V ,
i.e.,
Π ≥ Π∗ −B/V,
where V > 0 and B =
∑
i∈[1,F ]Bi. Bi is defined in Theorem
6, ∀i ∈ [1, F ].
The proof to this theorem is also based on the Lyapunov
optimization theory [19]. The gap B/V can be close to zero
by fixing ǫs and increasing V . Detailed proof is included in
Appendix J.
Theorem 8 (Asymptotic Optimality in Social Welfare of Alg. 1):
Let Π∗ be the offline optimum of the time-averaged social
welfare in (16), obtained with full information of the
federation over the entire time span [0, T − 1]. Suppose all
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clouds are homogenous, i.e., with the same number of servers
(Nmi ) and the same maximum per-server VM provisioning
(Cmi ) for each VM type m, with i.i.d. service prices, job
arrivals and operational costs. When the number of clouds,
F , grows, the sum of time-averaged profits achieved by all
clouds by running Alg. 1 under the double auction mechanism
in Sec. V, approaches the offline-optimal social welfare Π∗,
by a constant gap B/V , i.e.,
Π ≥ Π∗ −B/V,
where V > 0 and B =
∑
i∈[1,F ]Bi. Bi is defined in Theorem
6, ∀i ∈ [1, F ].
To prove the theorem, we demonstrate that, when the
number of clouds goes to infinity, the one-shot social welfare
obtained with Alg. 1 is the same as that achieved by the
dynamic benchmark Alg. 2 in the same time slot. Details are
in Appendix K.
VIII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Simulation Setup
We carry out trace-driven simulation studies based on
Google cluster-usage data [21] [22], which record jobs submit-
ted to the Google cluster, with information on their resource
demands (CPU, RAM, etc.) and relative charges. We translate
the data into concrete job arrival rates, resource types and
prices, to drive our simulations as follows.
We consider 24 types of jobs (< ms, gs, ds >), 6 VM types
(ms) combined from {small, median, large} CPU and {small,
large} Memory, and two SLA levels (ds), corresponding to
a larger maximum respond delay and a smaller maximum
response delay at half of the former. Each job requires either
1 VM or 2 VMs concurrently (gs).
There are 10 clouds in the federation. One time slot is
1 hour. The number of servers in each cloud that provision
VMs of each type ranges within [800, 1000]. Each server can
provide 30 small-memory VMs or 10 large-memory VMs. The
VM charge to the customer is decided by multiplying gs by the
relative VM price in the Google data, and then by the unit VM
price in the range of [0.05, 0.08] $/h. The penalty for dropping
a job is set to the maximum per-job VM charge in the system.
Operational costs are set according to the electricity prices at
10 different geographic locations provided in [17], which vary
on a hourly basis. Each server consumes power at 1 KW/h.
The number of job arrivals in each hour to the federation
is set according to the cumulated job requests of each type
submitted to the Google cluster during that hour, in the rough
range of [40000, 90000] requests per hour. We randomly assign
each arrived job to one of the 10 clouds, following a heavy-
tailed distribution. In operating the virtual queues, we set ǫs =
1000 for jobs requiring low response delay, and ǫs = 500 for
those of long delays. The maximum number of job drops per
hour is 1000 for all job types.
For comparison purposes, we also implement a simpler
heuristic algorithm for each cloud to bid in the double auction
and to schedules its jobs/servers: The cloud decides a value
for each unscheduled job in a queue as the penalty to drop
it if the next time slot is the deadline for scheduling, or the
charged price upon its arrival otherwise. The true values of
buy/sell prices for a type-m VM at this cloud are set to the
same, as the largest average value of jobs in a queue, among
all job queues requiring type-m VM(s). The quantity of VMs
in a buy-bid is set to the number of unscheduled jobs in the
queue with the largest average value as computed above. The
quantity of VMs in a sell-bid is the overall number of VMs
of the type that the cloud can provide. All VMs purchased
via the auction are used to serve jobs from the queue with
the maximum average value. A cloud maintains the minimum
number of servers to support those jobs, and only drops a job
when its maximum response delay is reached.
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Fig. 2. Comparisons of individual profit with different values of V .
B. Individual Profit and Social Welfare
We compare the time-averaged profit achieved at each cloud
with our dynamic algorithm in Alg. 1 and with the heuristic
algorithm, after the system has been running for 2000 hours.
Fig. 2 shows that our algorithm can achieve a higher profit
than the heuristic, at each of the 10 clouds, when the value of
V is no less than 4× 106. The observation is that when V is
larger, the individual profit with our algorithm is even better,
since it is closer to the offline optimum.
We next compare the social welfare achieved with Alg. 1,
the heuristic, and the dynamic benchmark Alg. 2. Fig. 3 shows
that social welfare achieved with Alg. 1 is mostly within
7.7% of that by the benchmark algorithm, even under our
heterogenous settings. It outperforms the heuristic by 19.2%.
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The social welfare is larger at larger V ’s in cases of both
Alg. 1 and the benchmark algorithm, verifying Theorems 6
and 8 in that they approach the respective offline optimum
when V grows.
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Fig. 3. Comparisons of social welfare.
C. Response Delay and Job Drop
We next investigate the scheduling delays experienced by
jobs. In our system, a maximum response delay is set as
the SLA objective for each type of jobs. Here, we study
the average response delay actually experienced by the jobs,
when the longer maximum response delay is set to different
values. Fig. 4(a) shows that both Alg. 1 and the benchmark
algorithm incur a low average response delay (well ahead of
scheduling deadlines), as compared to that of the heuristic. The
reasons are: i) the heuristic algorithm always greedily keeps
jobs in queues for future scheduling until near the deadline;
and ii) both Alg. 1 and the benchmark algorithm evaluate the
scheduling urgency better than the heuristic does, such that
jobs are tended to be served well before the deadlines.
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Fig. 4. Comparisons of average job scheduling delay and drop percentage.
We also study the percentage of admitted jobs in the entire
federation that are eventually dropped with the three algo-
rithms. Fig. 4(b) reveals that the drop rate decreases quickly
with the increase of the allowed maximum response delay,
and Alg. 1 and the benchmark algorithm again outperform the
heuristic, due to their well-designed scheduling strategies.
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates both individual-profit maximizing
and social-welfare efficient strategies at individual selfish
clouds in a cloud federation, in VM trades across cloud
boundaries. We tailor a truthful, individual-rational, ex-post
budget-balanced double auction as the inter-cloud trading
mechanism, and design a dynamic algorithm for each cloud
to decide the best VM valuation and bidding strategies, and
to schedule job service/drop and server provisioning in the
most economic fashion, under time-varying job arrivals and
operational costs. The proposed algorithm can obtain a time-
averaged profit for each cloud within a constant gap to its
offline maximum, as well as a close-to-optimum social welfare
in the entire federation, based on both solid theoretical analysis
and trace-driven simulation studies under realistic setting. As
future work, we are interested in broadening our investigations
to front-end job pricing and competition for customers among
the clouds, and the connection between front-end charging
strategies and inter-cloud trading strategies in a cloud federa-
tion.
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APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF THE ONE-SHOT OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
FOR INDIVIDUAL PROFIT MAXIMIZATION
Squaring the queuing laws (2) and (4), we can derive the
following inequality
∆(Θi(t)) ≤
1
2
∑
s∈[1,S]
[[
F∑
j=1
µsij(t) +D
s
i (t)]
2 + [rsi (t)]
2 + 2Qsi (t)[r
s
i (t)
−
F∑
j=1
µsij(t)−D
s
i (t)] + [1{Qs
i
(t)>0}ǫs]
2 + [Dsi (t)
+ 1{Qs
i
(t)=0}
F∑
j=1
Cmsj N
ms
j /gs
+ 1{Qs
i
(t)>0}
F∑
j=1
µsij(t)]
2
+ 2Zsi (t)[1{Qsi (t)>0}[ǫs −
F∑
j=1
µsij(t)]−D
s
i (t)
− 1{Qs
i
(t)=0}
F∑
j=1
Cmsj N
ms
j /gs]]
≤
1
2
∑
s∈[1,S]
[[
F∑
j=1
Cmsj N
ms
j /gs +D
s(max)
i ]
2 + [Rsi ]
2
+ 2Qsi (t)[r
s
i (t)−
F∑
j=1
µsij(t)−D
s
i (t)]
+ [ǫs]
2 + [D
s(max)
i +
F∑
j=1
Cmsj N
ms
j /gs]
2
+ 2Zsi (t)[ǫs −
F∑
j=1
µsij(t)−D
s
i (t)]]
=Bi +
∑
s∈[1,S]
[Qsi (t)[r
s
i (t)−
F∑
j=1
µsij(t)−D
s
i (t)]
+ Zsi (t)[ǫs −
F∑
j=1
µsij(t)−D
s
i (t)]],
where Bi = 12
∑
s∈[1,S][[
∑F
j=1 C
ms
j N
ms
j /gs+D
s(max)
i ]
2+[Rsi ]
2+
[ǫs]
2 + [D
s(max)
i +
∑F
j=1 C
ms
j N
ms
j /gs]
2].
By applying the drift-plus-penalty framework (or equiv-
alently, drift-minus-profit here), we subtract the weighted
one-shot individual profit of cloud i in time t, i.e.,
V · [
∑
m∈[1,M ][sˆ
m
i (t)ηˆ
m
i (t) − bˆ
m
i (t)γˆ
m
i (t) − βi(t)n
m
i (t)] +∑
s∈[1,S][p
s
i (t) · r
s
i (t)−D
s
i (t)ξ
s
i ]], on both sides of the above
inequality. Hence, we have the following inequality:
∆(Θi(t))− V · [
∑
m∈[1,M]
[sˆmi (t)ηˆ
m
i (t)− bˆ
m
i (t)γˆ
m
i (t)− βi(t)n
m
i (t)]
+
∑
s∈[1,S]
[psi (t) · r
s
i (t)−D
s
i (t)ξ
s
i ]]
≤Bi +
∑
s∈[1,S]
[Qsi (t)r
s
i (t) + Z
s
i (t)ǫs − V p
s
i (t) · r
s
i (t)]
− ϕi1(t)− ϕ
i
2(t)− ϕ
i
3(t),
where V > 0 is a user-defined positive constant that can be
understood as the weight of profit in the expression.
APPENDIX B
FINDING TRUE VALUES bˆmi (t), γˆmi (t), sˆmi (t) AND ηˆmi (t)
Based on individual rationality and truthfulness of the dou-
ble auction mechanism, each buyer/seller pays/charges a price
that is no higher/lower than the corresponding bid (true) value,
while the number of VMs actually traded is no larger than the
bid (true) value if the bid is successful, i.e., bˆmi (t) ≤ b˜mi (t),
sˆmi (t) ≥ s˜
m
i (t), γˆ
m
i (t) ≤ γ˜
m
i (t) and ηˆmi (t) ≤ η˜mi (t). That
is, the utility obtained by each cloud by participating in the
auction is non-negative. Hence, the utility obtained by trading
each VM at each winning buyer, i.e., b˜mi (t)− bˆmi (t), or seller,
i.e., s˜mi (t)− sˆmi (t), is non-negative. Therefore, bidding for the
maximum number of potential VMs provisioned, maximizes
the utility of a seller or buyer, i.e., the maximum number of
type-m VMs a cloud is willing to sell or buy is the maximum
number of potential type-m VMs provisioned in the federation,
and hence the true values of the VM volumes to bid at each
cloud are derived as in Eqn. (25) and (26), respectively.
We next identify the true values of the bidding prices for
each type of VMs, m ∈ [1,M ], at cloud i case by case:
⊲ Case 1: Cloud i’s buy-bid for type-m VMs wins, but not the
sell-bid.
In this case, we know that: i) all bought type-m VMs are
from other clouds and should be used for job scheduling
according to constraint (9); ii) sˆmi (t) = 0 and ηˆmi (t) = 0.
A nice property of problem (19) is that, all decision vari-
ables related to type-m VMs, i.e., bmi (t), γmi , bˆmi (t), γˆmi (t),
αmij (t), n
m
i (t), and µsij(t) with ms = m, are independent from
those related to the other types of VMs. Hence, the optimal
solutions to decision variables related to type-m VMs can be
derived by solving the following sub problem from (19):
max
∑
s:ms=m,s∈[1,S]
∑
j∈[1,F ]
µsij(t)[Q
s
i (t) + Z
s
i (t)]− V bˆ
m
i (t)γˆ
m
i (t)
− V βi(t)n
m
i (t) (47)
s.t. Constraint (5)-(9).
In (47), we replace γˆmi (t) by
∑
j∈[1,F ] α
m
ij (t) based on
Eqn. (7), and replace µsij(t)’s by the optimal solutions in
Eqn. (28) and (29) (to be derived in Sec. IV-C). We obtain
max
∑
j 6=i,j∈[1,F ]
αmij (t)[
Q
s∗m
i (t) + Z
s∗m
i (t)
gs∗m
− V bˆmi (t)]
+ µ
s∗m
ii (t)(Q
s∗m
i (t) + Z
s∗m
i (t))− V βi(t)n
m
i (t). (48)
According to Eqn. (28) and Eqn. (27), if Q
s∗m
i
(t)+Z
s∗m
i
(t)
V gs∗m
>
βi(t)
Cm
i
, we have
µ
s∗m
ii (t)(Q
s∗m
i (t) + Z
s∗m
i (t))− V βi(t)n
m
i (t)
=Nmi [C
m
i
Q
s∗m
i (t) + Z
s∗m
i (t)
gs∗m
− V βi(t)];
otherwise, we have
µ
s∗m
ii (t)(Q
s∗m
i (t) + Z
s∗m
i (t))− V βi(t)n
m
i (t) = 0.
Both RHS values of the above equations are constants. As
a result, the optimization problem (48) is finally equivalent to
the following one:
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max
∑
j 6=i,j∈[1,F ]
αmij (t)[
Q
s∗m
i (t) + Z
s∗m
i (t)
gs∗m
− V bˆmi (t)]. (49)
According to the definition of true values, we know that
the true value of b˜mi (t) should be
Q
s∗m
i
(t)+Z
s∗m
i
(t)
V gs∗m
as defined
in Eqn. (21), since: i) if bˆmi (t) > Q
s∗m
i (t)+Z
s∗m
i (t)
V gs∗m
, the utility in
(49) is negative, and hence a profit loss in terms of problem
(18) for cloud i; ii) if bˆmi (t) < Q
s∗m
i
(t)+Z
s∗m
i
(t)
V gs∗m
, the utility in
(49) is positive, and hence a profit gain in terms of problem
(18); and iii) if bˆmi (t) = Q
s∗m
i
(t)+Z
s∗m
i
(t)
V gs∗m
, the utility in (49) is
zero, and the profit of cloud i in (18) remains the same as not
acquiring the VMs.
⊲ Case 2: Cloud i’s sell-bid for type-m VMs wins, but not the
buy-bid.
In this case, we know that: i) all type-m VMs sold from
cloud i are used by other clouds for job scheduling according
to constraint (9); and ii) bˆmi (t) = 0 and γˆmi (t) = 0.
Similar to the analysis in Case 1, the optimal solutions to
variables related to type-m VMs can be obtained by solving
the following optimization problem:
max
∑
s:ms=m,s∈[1,S]
∑
j 6=i
µsij(t)[Q
s
i (t) + Z
s
i (t)] + V sˆ
m
i (t)ηˆ
m
i (t)
− V βi(t)n
m
i (t) (50)
s.t. Constraint (5)-(9).
In (50), we replace ηˆmi (t) by
∑
j 6=i α
m
ji (t) based on Eqn. (8)
and the fact in this case that αmii (t) = 0, and replace µsij(t)’s
and nmi (t)’s with the optimal solutions in Eqn. (28), (29) and
Eqn. (27). Then we have the following two cases:
i) if Q
s∗m
i (t)+Z
s∗m
i (t)
V gs∗m
> βi(t)
Cm
i
, problem (50) is equivalent to
max Nmi [C
m
i
Q
s∗m
i (t) + Z
s∗m
i (t)
gs∗m
− V βi(t)]
+
∑
j 6=i
αmji(t)[V sˆ
m
i (t)−
Q
s∗m
i (t) + Z
s∗m
i (t)
gs∗m
],
where the true value of s˜mi (t) should be
Q
s∗m
i
(t)+Z
s∗m
i
(t)
V gs∗m
according to the definition of true value of the price to sell a
type-m VM;
ii) otherwise, problem (50) is equivalent to
max V
∑
j 6=i
αmji(t)[sˆ
m
i (t)− βi(t)/C
m
i ],
where the true value of s˜mi (t) should be βi(t)/Cmi according
to the definition of the true value of the price to sell a type-m
VM. Hence, we have derived the true values of s˜mi (t) given
in Eqn. (22).
⊲ Case 3: Both Cloud i’s buy-bid and sell-bid for type-m VMs
win.
In this case, the following properties hold:
Property 1. If both cloud i’s buy-bid and sell-bid for type-m
VMs win, the cloud cannot buy a type-m VM with a price
strictly higher than its price to sell a type-m VM, i.e., sˆmi (t) ≥
bˆmi (t). Otherwise, there will be a positive profit loss at the
cloud by self-trading its own type-m VMs, which violates its
individual rationality.
Property 2. If both cloud i’s buy-bid and sell-bid for type-
m VMs win, the cloud cannot sell a type-m VM with a price
strictly higher than its price to buy a type-m VM, i.e., sˆmi (t) ≤
bˆmi (t). Otherwise, the auctioneer has to pay a positive sum to
compensate for the price difference for those inter-cloud traded
type-m VMs, which contradicts the ex-post budget balance
property at the auctioneer.
Property 3. Based on Properties 1 and 2, if both cloud i’s
buy-bid and sell-bid for type-m VMs win, the actual buy and
sell prices at the cloud for type-m VMs are the same, i.e.,
sˆmi (t) = bˆ
m
i (t).
According to Property 3, we derive that the overall profit
gain at cloud i for self-trading of type-m VMs, αmii (t)[sˆmi (t)−
bˆmi (t)], is zero.
The optimal solutions to variables related to type-m VMs
can be obtained by solving the following optimization prob-
lem:
max
∑
s:ms=m,s∈[1,S]
∑
j∈[1,F ]
µsij(t)[Q
s
i (t) + Z
s
i (t)]− V bˆ
m
i (t)γˆ
m
i (t)
+ V sˆmi (t)ηˆ
m
i (t)− V βi(t)n
m
i (t) (51)
s.t. Constraint (5)-(9).
In (51), we replace γˆmi (t) by
∑
j∈[1,F ] α
m
ij (t) based on
Eqn. (7), and ηˆmi (t) by
∑
j∈[1,F ] α
m
ji(t) based on Eqn. (8). We
also replace µsij(t)’s and nmi (t)’s with the optimal solutions
in Eqn. (28), (29) and Eqn. (27). Then we have the following
two cases:
i) if Q
s∗m
i (t)+Z
s∗m
i (t)
V gs∗m
> βi(t)
Cm
i
, problem (51) is equivalent to
max Nmi [C
m
i
Q
s∗m
i (t) + Z
s∗m
i (t)
gs∗m
− V βi(t)]
∑
j 6=i
αmij (t)[
Q
s∗m
i (t) + Z
s∗m
i (t)
gs∗m
− V bˆmi (t)]
+
∑
j 6=i
αmji(t)[V sˆ
m
i (t)−
Q
s∗m
i (t) + Z
s∗m
i (t)
gs∗m
],
where the true values of b˜mi (t) and s˜mi (t) should both be
Q
s∗m
i
(t)+Z
s∗m
i
(t)
V gs∗m
according to the definition of true value of the
price to buy/sell a type-m VM;
ii) otherwise, problem (51) is equivalent to
max
∑
j 6=i
αmij (t)[
Q
s∗m
i (t) + Z
s∗m
i (t)
gs∗m
− V bˆmi (t)]
V
∑
j 6=i
αmji(t)[sˆ
m
i (t)− βi(t)/C
m
i ],
where the true value of b˜mi (t) should be
Q
s∗m
i (t)+Z
s∗m
i (t)
V gs∗m
, and
the true value of s˜mi (t) should be βi(t)/Cmi according to the
definition of the true value of the price to buy/sell a type-m
VM. Hence, we have derived the true values of b˜mi (t) and
s˜mi (t) given in Eqn. (21) and Eqn. (22).
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APPENDIX C
DERIVATION OF THE ONE-SHOT OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
FOR SOCIAL WELFARE MAXIMIZATION
Squaring the queuing laws (2) and (4), we can derive the
following inequality
∆(Θ(t)) ≤
1
2
∑
i∈[1,F ]
∑
s∈[1,S]
[[
F∑
j=1
µsij(t) +D
s
i (t)]
2 + [rsi (t)]
2
+ 2Qsi (t)[r
s
i (t)−
F∑
j=1
µsij(t)−D
s
i (t)] + [1{Qsi (t)>0}ǫs]
2
+ [Dsi (t) + 1{Qsi (t)=0}
F∑
j=1
Cmsj N
ms
j /gs
+ 1{Qs
i
(t)>0}
F∑
j=1
µsij(t)]
2
+ 2Zsi (t)[1{Qs
i
(t)>0}[ǫs −
F∑
j=1
µsij(t)]−D
s
i (t)
− 1{Qs
i
(t)=0}
F∑
j=1
Cmsj N
ms
j /gs]]
≤
1
2
∑
i∈[1,F ]
∑
s∈[1,S]
[[
F∑
j=1
Cmsj N
ms
j /gs +D
s(max)
i ]
2 + [Rsi ]
2
+ 2Qsi (t)[r
s
i (t)−
F∑
j=1
µsij(t)−D
s
i (t)]
+ [ǫs]
2 + [D
s(max)
i +
F∑
j=1
Cmsj N
ms
j /gs]
2
+ 2Zsi (t)[ǫs −
F∑
j=1
µsij(t)−D
s
i (t)]]
=B +
∑
i∈[1,F ]
∑
s∈[1,S]
[Qsi (t)[r
s
i (t)−
F∑
j=1
µsij(t)−D
s
i (t)]
+ Zsi (t)[ǫs −
F∑
j=1
µsij(t)−D
s
i (t)]],
where B = 1
2
∑
i∈[1,F ]
∑
s∈[1,S][[
∑F
j=1 C
ms
j N
ms
j /gs +
D
s(max)
i ]
2 + [Rsi ]
2 + [ǫs]
2 + [D
s(max)
i +
∑F
j=1 C
ms
j N
ms
j /gs]
2].
By applying the drift-plus-penalty framework (or
equivalently, drift-minus-profit here), we subtract the
weighted one-shot social welfare in time t, i.e.,
V ·
∑
i∈[1,F ][
∑
m∈[1,M ][sˆ
m
i (t)ηˆ
m
i (t) − bˆ
m
i (t)γˆ
m
i (t) −
βi(t)n
m
i (t)] +
∑
s∈[1,S][p
s
i (t) · r
s
i (t) − D
s
i (t)ξ
s
i ]], on both
sides of the above inequality. Hence, we have the following
inequality:
∆(Θ(t))− V ·
∑
i∈[1,F ]
[
∑
m∈[1,M]
[sˆmi (t)ηˆ
m
i (t)− bˆ
m
i (t)γˆ
m
i (t)
− βi(t)n
m
i (t)] +
∑
s∈[1,S]
[psi (t) · r
s
i (t)−D
s
i (t)ξ
s
i ]]
≤B +
∑
i∈[1,F ]
∑
s∈[1,S]
[Qsi (t)r
s
i (t) + Z
s
i (t)ǫs − V p
s
i (t) · r
s
i (t)]
− ϕ1(t)− ϕ2(t),
where V > 0 is a user-defined positive constant that can be
understood as the weight of profit in the expression.
APPENDIX D
PROOF TO THEOREM 2
This theorem can be proved based on the following two
lemmas.
Lemma 2 (Monotonic winner determination): Given prices
of buy-bids {bm1 (t), . . . , bmi (t), . . . , bmF (t)} and sell-bids
{sm1 (t), . . . , s
m
i (t), . . . , s
m
F (t)}, we have that
1) If cloud i wins the buy-bid by bidding with bmi (t),
then cloud i also wins the buy-bid by bidding with
b′ > bmi (t);
2) If cloud i wins the sell-bid by bidding with smi (t),
then cloud i also wins the sell-bid by bidding with
s′ < smi (t).
Proof: We prove the cases in the lemma respectively as
follows,
1) Since cloud i wins the buy-bid with bmi (t), we know that
bmi (t) is the largest among all buy-bids, i.e., bmi (t) ≥
bmj (t), ∀j 6= i, j ∈ [1, F ]. With b′ > bmi (t), we have
that b′ > bmj (t), ∀j 6= i, j ∈ [1, F ]. Hence, if cloud i
proposes a buy-bid with b′, it can still win the buy-bid
according to our winner determination decision, since
its buy-bid price is still the largest among all buy-bids.
2) Since cloud i wins the sell-bid with smi (t) and the
sell-bids are sorted in ascending order, we know that
smi (t) ≤ ϑ
m
j′ (t), where j′ is the critical index as defined
in Eqn. (31), and smi (t) is among the (j′ − 1)th lowest
sell-bids in ascending order. With s′ < smi (t), we also
have that s′ < ϑmj′ (t) and s′ is among the (j′ − 1)th
lowest sell-bids in ascending order. Hence, if cloud i
propose a sell-bid with s′, it can still win the sell-bid
according to our winner determination decision, since
its sell-bid price is still among the (j′ − 1)th lowest
sell-bids.
Lemma 3 (Bid-independent pricing): Given prices of
buy-bids {bm1 (t), . . . , bmi (t), . . . , bmF (t)} and sell-bids
{sm1 (t), . . . , s
m
i (t), . . . , s
m
F (t)}, we have that
1) If cloud i wins the buy-bid by bidding with bmi (t) and
b′, the charged price bˆmi (t) to cloud i is the same for
both;
2) If cloud i wins the sell-bid by bidding with smi (t) and
s′, the charged price sˆmi (t) to cloud i is the same for
both.
Proof: We prove the the cases in the lemma respectively
as follows,
1) Since cloud i wins the buy-bid, the charged price bˆmi (t)
should be θm2 (t), which is the second largest buy-bid
price independent of cloud i’s buy-bid, according to our
pricing scheme in the auction. And we have that bmi (t) ≥
θm2 (t) and b′ ≥ θm2 (t). We also have that, as long as
cloud i wins the buy-bid, the value of the second largest
buy-bid price θm2 (t) does not change. Hence, cloud i
should be charged with θm2 (t) by bidding with no matter
bmi (t) or b
′
.
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2) Since cloud i wins the sell-bid, the charged price sˆmi (t)
should be ϑmj′ (t), which is the j′th lowest sell-bid price,
according to our pricing scheme in the auction. And we
have that smi (t) ≤ ϑmj′ (t) and s′ ≤ ϑmj′ (t). As long as
cloud i wins the sell-bid, we have that smi (t) and s′
should be among the (j′ − 1)th lowest sell-bid prices
and the value of ϑmj′ (t) does not change. Hence, cloud
i should be charged with the same price with ϑmj′ (t) by
bidding with no matter bmi (t) or b′ if it wins the sell-bid.
We can then prove the Theorem 2 to show that any cloud
i cannot obtain higher utility gain by bidding untruthfully,
i.e., bmi (t) 6= b˜mi (t) and/or smi (t) 6= s˜mi (t), ∀m ∈ [1,M ],
by analyzing all possible auction results.
Case 1 – Cloud i wins both buy-bid and sell-bid with truthful
bidding: In this case, the charged/paid prices for buy-bid and
sell-bid are θm2 (t) and ϑmj′ (t), respectively. We discuss the all
possibly cases of untruthful bidding as follows,
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) > b˜mi (t) and smi (t) > s˜mi (t):
According to Lemma 2, cloud i still wins the buy-bid
but may either win or lose the sell-bid. If it also wins
the sell-bid, we have that the charged/paid prices for
buy-bid and sell-bid are θm2 (t) and ϑmj′ (t), respectively,
according to Lemma 3; the utility gain is zero by bidding
untruthfully since the charged/paid prices are the same
with that by bidding truthfully. If it loses the sell-bid,
we have that the charged prices for buy-bid and sell-bid
are θm2 (t) and 0, respectively, according to Lemma 3 and
our pricing scheme, and no VM is sold by cloud i; the
utility gain is non-positive by bidding untruthfully, since
the charged buy-bid price remains the same while there is
non-negative utility loss, i.e., [ϑmj′ (t)− s˜mi (t)]ηˆmi (t) with
ϑmj′ (t) ≥ s˜
m
i (t), by losing the sell-bid.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) > b˜mi (t) and smi (t) = s˜mi (t):
According to Lemma 2, cloud i still wins the buy-bid.
It is also easy to see that cloud i still wins the sell-
bid with the same bidding price for sell-bid. Hence, the
charged/paid prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are θm2 (t) and
ϑmj′ (t), respectively, according to Lemma 3. The utility
gain is zero by bidding untruthfully.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) > b˜mi (t) and smi (t) < s˜mi (t):
According to Lemma 2, cloud i still wins both the buy-bid
and the sell-bid. The charged/paid prices for buy-bid and
sell-bid are θm2 (t) and ϑmj′ (t), respectively, according to
Lemma 3. The utility gain is zero by bidding untruthfully.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) = b˜mi (t) and smi (t) > s˜mi (t):
Cloud i stills wins the buy-bid with the same bidding
price for buy-bid. However, it may either win or lose
the sell-bid. If it also wins the sell-bid, we have that the
charged/paid prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are θm2 (t)
and ϑmj′ (t), respectively, according to Lemma 3 and our
pricing scheme; the utility gain is zero by bidding un-
truthfully since the charged/paid prices are the same with
that by bidding truthfully. If it loses the sell-bid, we have
that the charged prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are θm2 (t)
and 0, respectively, according to our pricing scheme, and
no VM is sold by cloud i; the utility gain is non-positive
by bidding untruthfully, since the charged buy-bid price
remains the same while there is non-negative utility loss,
by losing the sell-bid.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) = b˜mi (t) and smi (t) < s˜mi (t):
According to Lemma 2, cloud i still wins the sell-bid.
It is also easy to see that cloud i still wins the buy-
bid with the same bidding price for buy-bid. Hence, the
charged/paid prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are θm2 (t) and
ϑmj′ (t), respectively, according to Lemma 3. The utility
gain is zero by bidding untruthfully.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) < b˜mi (t) and smi (t) > s˜mi (t):
The cloud can either win both buy and sell bids, or
win buy-bid only, or win sell-bid only, or lose both
bids. If the cloud still wins both bids, we have that the
charged/paid prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are θm2 (t)
and ϑmj′ (t), respectively, according to our pricing scheme;
the utility gain is zero by bidding untruthfully since the
charged/paid prices are the same with that by bidding
truthfully. If it only wins the buy-bid, we have that the
charged prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are θm2 (t) and
0, respectively, according to Lemma our pricing scheme,
and no VM is sold by cloud i; the utility gain is non-
positive by bidding untruthfully, since the charged buy-
bid price remains the same while there is non-negative
utility loss, by losing the sell-bid. If it only wins the
sell-bid, we have that the charged prices for buy-bid and
sell-bid are 0 and ϑmj′ (t), respectively, according to our
pricing scheme, and no VM is bought by cloud i; the
utility gain is non-positive by bidding untruthfully, since
the charged sell-bid price remains the same while there
is non-negative utility loss, i.e., [b˜mi (t) − θm2 (t)] · γˆmi (t)
with b˜mi (t) ≥ θm2 (t), by losing the buy-bid. If it loses
both bids, we have that the charged prices for buy-bid and
sell-bid are both 0, according to our pricing scheme, and
no VM is bought by or sold by cloud i; the utility gain is
non-positive by bidding untruthfully, since there is non-
negative utility loss, i.e., [b˜mi (t)−θm2 (t)]·γˆmi (t)+[ϑmj′ (t)−
s˜mi (t)] · ηˆ
m
i (t) with b˜mi (t) ≥ θm2 (t) and ϑmj′ (t) ≥ s˜mi (t),
by losing the both bids.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) < b˜mi (t) and smi (t) = s˜mi (t):
Cloud i stills wins the sell-bid with the same bidding
price for sell-bid. However, it may either win or lose the
buy-bid. If it also wins the buy-bid, we have that the
charged/paid prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are θm2 (t)
and ϑmj′ (t), respectively, according to our pricing scheme;
the utility gain is zero by bidding untruthfully since the
charged/paid prices are the same with that by bidding
truthfully. If it loses the buy-bid, we have that the
charged prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are 0 and ϑmj′ (t),
respectively, according to our pricing scheme, and no
VM is bought by cloud i; the utility gain is non-positive
by bidding untruthfully, since the charged sell-bid price
remains the same while there is non-negative utility loss,
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by losing the buy-bid.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) < b˜mi (t) and smi (t) < s˜mi (t):
According to Lemma 2, cloud i still wins the sell-bid
but may either win or lose the buy-bid. If it also wins the
buy-bid, we have that the charged/paid prices for buy-bid
and sell-bid are θm2 (t) and ϑmj′ (t), respectively, according
to Lemma 3 and our pricing scheme; the utility gain is
zero by bidding untruthfully since the charged/paid prices
are the same with that by bidding truthfully. If it loses
the buy-bid, we have that the charged prices for buy-bid
and sell-bid are 0 and ϑmj′ (t), respectively, according to
Lemma 3 and our pricing scheme, and no VM is bought
by cloud i; the utility gain is non-positive by bidding
untruthfully, since the charged sell-bid price remains the
same while there is non-negative utility loss, by losing
the buy-bid.
Case 2 – Cloud i wins buy-bid but loses sell-bid with truthful
bidding: In this case, the charged/paid prices for buy-bid and
sell-bid are θm2 (t) and 0, respectively. we discuss the all
possible cases of untruthful bidding as follows,
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) > b˜mi (t) and smi (t) > s˜mi (t):
According to Lemma 2, cloud i still wins the buy-bid.
It is also easy to see that cloud i still loses the sell-bid,
since otherwise we will have a contradiction to Lemma
2. Hence, the charged/paid prices for buy-bid and sell-bid
are θm2 (t) and 0, respectively, according to Lemma 3 and
our pricing scheme. The utility gain is zero by bidding
untruthfully.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) > b˜mi (t) and smi (t) = s˜mi (t):
According to Lemma 2, cloud i still wins the buy-bid.
It is also easy to see that cloud i still loses the sell-
bid with the same bidding price for sell-bid. Hence, the
charged/paid prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are θm2 (t)
and 0, respectively, according to Lemma 3 and pricing
scheme. The utility gain is zero by bidding untruthfully.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) > b˜mi (t) and smi (t) < s˜mi (t):
According to Lemma 2, cloud i still wins the buy-bid but
may either win or lose the sell-bid. If it loses the sell-
bid, we have that the charged prices for buy-bid and sell-
bid are θm2 (t) and 0, respectively, according to Lemma 3
and our pricing scheme, and no VM is sold by cloud i;
the utility gain is zero by bidding untruthfully since the
charged/paid prices are the same with that by bidding
truthfully. If it also wins the sell-bid, we have that the
charged/paid prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are θm2 (t)
and ϑmj′ (t) ≤ s˜mi (t), respectively, according to Lemma 3
and our pricing scheme; the utility gain is non-positive
by bidding untruthfully, since the charged buy-bid price
remains the same while there is non-negative utility loss,
i.e., [s˜mi (t) − ϑmj′ (t)]ηˆmi (t) with ϑmj′ (t) ≤ s˜mi (t), by
winning the sell-bid.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) = b˜mi (t) and smi (t) > s˜mi (t):
Cloud i still wins the buy-bid with the same bidding price.
It is also easy to see that cloud i still loses the sell-bid,
since otherwise we will have a contradiction to Lemma 2.
Hence, the charged/paid prices for buy-bid and sell-bid
are θm2 (t) and 0, respectively, according to our pricing
scheme. The utility gain is zero by bidding untruthfully.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) = b˜mi (t) and smi (t) < s˜mi (t):
Cloud i still wins the buy-bid with the same bidding
price. However, it may either win or lose the sell-bid.
If it loses the sell-bid, we have that the charged prices
for buy-bid and sell-bid are θm2 (t) and 0, respectively,
according to our pricing scheme, and no VM is sold by
cloud i; the utility gain is zero by bidding untruthfully
since the charged/paid prices are the same with that by
bidding truthfully. If it also wins the sell-bid, we have
that the charged/paid prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are
θm2 (t) and ϑmj′ (t) ≤ s˜mi (t), respectively, according to our
pricing scheme; the utility gain is non-positive by bidding
untruthfully, since the charged buy-bid price remains the
same while there is non-negative utility loss, by winning
the sell-bid.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) < b˜mi (t) and smi (t) > s˜mi (t):
It is easy to see that cloud i still loses the sell-bid, since
otherwise we will have a contradiction to Lemma 2. How-
ever, it may either win or lose the buy-bid. If it also wins
the buy-bid, we have that the charged/paid prices for buy-
bid and sell-bid are θm2 (t) and 0, respectively, according
to our pricing scheme; the utility gain is zero by bidding
untruthfully since the charged/paid prices are the same
with that by bidding truthfully. If it loses the buy-bid, we
have that the charged prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are
0 and 0, respectively, according to Lemma our pricing
scheme, and no VM is bought or sold by cloud i; the
utility gain is non-positive by bidding untruthfully, since
the charged sell-bid price remains the same while there
is non-negative utility loss, i.e., [b˜mi (t) − θm2 (t)] · γˆmi (t)
with b˜mi (t) ≥ θm2 (t), by losing the buy-bid.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) < b˜mi (t) and smi (t) = s˜mi (t):
The cloud i still loses the sell-bid with the same bidding
price. However, it may either win or lose the buy-bid. If
it also wins the buy-bid, we have that the charged/paid
prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are θm2 (t) and 0, respec-
tively, according to our pricing scheme; the utility gain is
zero by bidding untruthfully since the charged/paid prices
are the same with that by bidding truthfully. If it loses
the buy-bid, we have that the charged prices for buy-bid
and sell-bid are 0 and 0, respectively, according to our
pricing scheme, and no VM is bought or sold by cloud
i; the utility gain is non-positive by bidding untruthfully,
since the charged sell-bid price remains the same while
there is non-negative utility loss, by losing the buy-bid.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) < b˜mi (t) and smi (t) < s˜mi (t):
The cloud can either win both buy and sell bids, or
win buy-bid only, or win sell-bid only, or lose both
bids. If the cloud wins both bids, we have that the
charged/paid prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are θm2 (t)
and ϑmj′ (t) ≤ s˜mi (t), respectively, according to our pricing
scheme; the utility gain is zero by bidding untruthfully
since the charged buy-bid price remains the same while
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there is non-negative utility loss, by winning the sell-
bid. If it only wins the buy-bid, we have that the
charged prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are θm2 (t) and
0, respectively, according to our pricing scheme, and
no VM is sold by cloud i; the utility gain is zero by
bidding untruthfully since the charged/paid prices are the
same with that by bidding truthfully. If it only wins
the sell-bid, we have that the charged prices for buy-
bid and sell-bid are 0 and ϑmj′ (t) ≤ s˜mi (t), respectively,
according to our pricing scheme, and no VM is bought
by cloud i; the utility gain is non-positive by bidding
untruthfully, since there is non-negative utility loss, i.e.,
[b˜mi (t) − θ
m
2 (t)] · γˆ
m
i (t) − [ϑ
m
j′ (t) − s˜
m
i (t)] · ηˆ
m
i (t) with
b˜mi (t) ≥ θ
m
2 (t) and ϑmj′ (t) ≤ s˜mi (t), by losing the buy-bid
while winning the sell-bid. If it loses both bids, we have
that the charged prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are both 0,
according to our pricing scheme, and no VM is bought
by or sold by cloud i; the utility gain is non-positive
by bidding untruthfully, since the charged sell-bid price
remains the same while there is non-negative utility loss,
i.e., [b˜mi (t)−θm2 (t)]·γˆmi (t) with b˜mi (t) ≥ θm2 (t), by losing
the buy-bid.
Case 3 – Cloud i wins sell-bid but loses buy-bid with truthful
bidding: In this case, the charged/paid prices for buy-bid and
sell-bid are 0 and ϑmj′ (t), respectively. we discuss the all
possible cases of untruthful bidding as follows,
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) > b˜mi (t) and smi (t) > s˜mi (t):
The cloud can either win both buy and sell bids, or win
buy-bid only, or win sell-bid only, or lose both bids. If
the cloud wins both bids, we have that the charged/paid
prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are θm2 (t) ≥ b˜mi (t) and
ϑmj′ (t), respectively, according to our pricing scheme; the
utility gain is non-positive by bidding untruthfully since
the charged sell-bid price remains the same while there is
non-negative utility loss, i.e., [θm2 (t)− b˜mi (t)] · γˆmi (t) with
b˜mi (t) ≤ θ
m
2 (t), by winning the buy-bid. If it only wins
the buy-bid, we have that the charged prices for buy-bid
and sell-bid are θm2 (t) and 0, respectively, according to
our pricing scheme, and no VM is sold by cloud i; the
utility gain is non-positive by bidding untruthfully since
there is non-negative utility loss, i.e., [θm2 (t) − b˜mi (t)] ·
γˆmi (t) + [ϑ
m
j′ (t) − s˜
m
i (t)] · ηˆ
m
i (t) with b˜mi (t) ≤ θm2 (t)
and ϑmj′ (t) ≥ s˜mi (t), by winning the buy-bid while losing
the sell-bid. If it only wins the sell-bid, we have that the
charged prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are 0 and ϑmj′ (t) ≤
s˜mi (t), respectively, according to our pricing scheme, and
no VM is bought by cloud i; the utility gain is zero by
bidding untruthfully since the charged/paid prices are the
same with that by bidding truthfully. If it loses both bids,
we have that the charged prices for buy-bid and sell-bid
are both 0, according to our pricing scheme, and no VM
is bought by or sold by cloud i; the utility gain is non-
positive by bidding untruthfully, since the charged buy-
bid price remains the same while there is non-negative
utility loss, i.e., [ϑmj′ (t) − s˜mi (t)] · ηˆmi (t) with ϑmj′ (t) ≥
s˜mi (t), by losing the sell-bid.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) > b˜mi (t) and smi (t) = s˜mi (t):
Cloud i still wins the sell-bid with the same bidding price.
However, it may either win or lose the buy-bid. If it also
wins the buy-bid, we have that the charged/paid prices for
buy-bid and sell-bid are θm2 (t) and ϑmj′ (t), respectively,
according to our pricing scheme; the utility gain is non-
positive by bidding untruthfully since the charged sell-
bid price remains the same while there is non-negative
utility loss, i.e., [θm2 (t) − b˜mi (t)] · γˆmi (t) with b˜mi (t) ≤
θm2 (t), by winning the buy-bid. If it loses the buy-bid,
we have that the charged prices for buy-bid and sell-bid
are 0 and ϑmj′ (t), respectively, according to our pricing
scheme, and no VM is bought or sold by cloud i; the
utility gain is non-positive by bidding untruthfully, since
the charged/paid prices are the same with that by bidding
truthfully.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) > b˜mi (t) and smi (t) < s˜mi (t):
According to Lemma 2, cloud i still wins the sell-bid but
may either win or lose the buy-bid. If it loses the buy-bid,
we have that the charged prices for buy-bid and sell-bid
are θm2 (t) and ϑmj′ (t), respectively, according to Lemma
3 and our pricing scheme, and no VM is sold by cloud i;
the utility gain is zero by bidding untruthfully since the
charged/paid prices are the same with that by bidding
truthfully. If it also wins the buy-bid, we have that the
charged/paid prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are θm2 (t) ≥
b˜mi (t) and ϑmj′ (t), respectively, according to Lemma 3
and our pricing scheme; the utility gain is non-positive
by bidding untruthfully, since the charged sell-bid price
remains the same while there is non-negative utility loss,
by winning the buy-bid.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) = b˜mi (t) and smi (t) > s˜mi (t):
Cloud i still loses the buy-bid with the same bidding
price. However, it may either win or lose the sell-bid. If
it loses the sell-bid, we have that the charged prices for
buy-bid and sell-bid are 0 and 0, respectively, according
to our pricing scheme, and no VM is sold by cloud i; the
utility gain is non-positive by bidding untruthfully since
the charged buy-bid price remains the same while there
is non-negative utility loss, i.e., [ϑmj′ (t) − s˜mi (t)] · ηˆmi (t)
with ϑmj′ (t) ≥ s˜mi (t), by losing the sell-bid. If it also wins
the sell-bid, we have that the charged/paid prices for buy-
bid and sell-bid are 0 and ϑmj′ (t) ≤ s˜mi (t), respectively,
according to our pricing scheme; the utility gain is zero
by bidding untruthfully since the charged/paid prices are
the same with that by bidding truthfully.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) = b˜mi (t) and smi (t) < s˜mi (t):
According to Lemma 2, cloud i still wins the sell-bid. It is
also easy to see that cloud i still loses the buy-bid with
the same bidding price. Hence, the charged/paid prices
for buy-bid and sell-bid are 0 and ϑmj′ (t), respectively,
according to Lemma 3 and our pricing scheme. The utility
gain is zero by bidding untruthfully.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) < b˜mi (t) and smi (t) > s˜mi (t):
It is easy to see that cloud i still loses the buy-bid,
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since otherwise we will have a contradiction to Lemma 2.
However, it may either win or lose the sell-bid. If it wins
the sell-bid, we have that the charged/paid prices for buy-
bid and sell-bid are 0 and ϑmj′ (t), respectively, according
to our pricing scheme; the utility gain is zero by bidding
untruthfully since the charged/paid prices are the same
with that by bidding truthfully. If it loses the sell-bid, we
have that the charged prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are
both 0, according to our pricing scheme, and no VM is
bought or sold by cloud i; the utility gain is non-positive
by bidding untruthfully, since the charged buy-bid price
remains the same while there is non-negative utility loss,
by losing the sell-bid.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) < b˜mi (t) and smi (t) = s˜mi (t):
Cloud i still wins the sell-bid with the same bidding price.
It is also easy to see that cloud i still loses the buy-bid,
since otherwise we will have a contradiction to Lemma 2.
Hence, the charged/paid prices for buy-bid and sell-bid
are 0 and ϑmj′ (t), respectively, according to our pricing
scheme. The utility gain is zero by bidding untruthfully.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) < b˜mi (t) and smi (t) < s˜mi (t):
According to Lemma 2, cloud i still wins the sell-bid.
It is also easy to see that cloud i still loses the buy-bid,
since otherwise we will have a contradiction to Lemma
2. Hence, the charged/paid prices for buy-bid and sell-bid
are 0 and ϑmj′ (t), respectively, according to Lemma 3 and
our pricing scheme. The utility gain is zero by bidding
untruthfully.
Case 4 – Cloud i loses both buy-bid and sell-bid with truthful
bidding: In this case, the charged/paid prices for buy-bid
and sell-bid are both 0. we discuss the all possible cases of
untruthful bidding as follows,
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) > b˜mi (t) and smi (t) > s˜mi (t):
It is easy to see that cloud i still loses the sell-bid,
since otherwise we will have a contradiction to Lemma
2. However, it may either win or lose the buy-bid. If it
wins the buy-bid, we have that the charged/paid prices
for buy-bid and sell-bid are θm2 (t) ≥ b˜mi (t) and 0,
respectively, according to our pricing scheme; the utility
gain is non-positive by bidding untruthfully there is non-
negative utility loss, i.e., [θm2 (t) − b˜mi (t)] · γˆmi (t) with
b˜mi (t) ≤ θ
m
2 (t), by winning the buy-bid. If it loses the
buy-bid, we have that the charged prices for buy-bid and
sell-bid are both 0, according to our pricing scheme, and
no VM is bought or sold by cloud i; the utility gain is
zero by bidding untruthfully.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) > b˜mi (t) and smi (t) = s˜mi (t):
Cloud i still loses the sell-bid with the same bidding price.
However, it may either win or lose the buy-bid. If it loses
the buy-bid, we have that the charged prices for buy-bid
and sell-bid are both 0, according to our pricing scheme,
and no VM is sold by cloud i; the utility gain is zero
by bidding untruthfully. If it also wins the buy-bid, we
have that the charged/paid prices for buy-bid and sell-bid
are θm2 (t) ≥ b˜
m
i (t) and 0, respectively, according to our
pricing scheme; the utility gain is non-positive by bidding
untruthfully there is non-negative utility loss, by winning
the buy-bid.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) > b˜mi (t) and smi (t) < s˜mi (t):
The cloud can either win both buy and sell bids, or win
buy-bid only, or win sell-bid only, or lose both bids. If
the cloud wins both bids, we have that the charged/paid
prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are θm2 (t) ≥ b˜mi (t) and
ϑmj′ (t) ≤ s˜
m
i (t), respectively, according to our pricing
scheme; the utility gain is non-positive by bidding un-
truthfully since there is non-negative utility loss, i.e.,
[θm2 (t) − b˜
m
i (t)] · γˆ
m
i (t) + [s˜
m
i (t) − ϑ
m
j′ (t)] · ηˆ
m
i (t) with
b˜mi (t) ≤ θ
m
2 (t) and ϑmj′ (t) ≤ s˜mi (t), by winning the buy-
bid and sell-bid. If it only wins the buy-bid, we have
that the charged prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are θm2 (t)
and 0, respectively, according to our pricing scheme, and
no VM is sold by cloud i; the utility gain is non-positive
by bidding untruthfully since the paid price for sell-bid is
the same with that by bidding truthfully and there is non-
negative utility loss, by winning the buy-bid. If it only
wins the sell-bid, we have that the charged prices for buy-
bid and sell-bid are 0 and ϑmj′ (t) ≤ s˜mi (t), respectively,
according to our pricing scheme, and no VM is bought
by cloud i; the utility gain is non-positive by bidding
untruthfully since the charged price for the buy-bid is the
same with that by bidding truthfully while there is non-
negative utility loss, i.e., [s˜mi (t) − ϑmj′ (t)] · ηˆmi (t) with
ϑmj′ (t) ≤ s˜
m
i (t), by winning the sell-bid. If it loses both
bids, we have that the charged prices for buy-bid and
sell-bid are both 0, according to our pricing scheme, and
no VM is bought by or sold by cloud i; the utility gain
is zero by bidding untruthfully.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) = b˜mi (t) and smi (t) > s˜mi (t):
It is easy to see that cloud i still loses the sell-bid, since
otherwise we will have a contradiction to Lemma 2. It
is also not hard to find that cloud i still loses the buy-
bid with the same bidding price. Hence, the charged/paid
prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are both 0, according to
our pricing scheme. The utility gain is zero by bidding
untruthfully.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) = b˜mi (t) and smi (t) < s˜mi (t):
It is not hard to find that cloud i still loses the buy-
bid with the same bidding price. However, it may either
win or lose the sell-bid. If it wins the sell-bid, we have
that the charged/paid prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are
0 and ϑmj′ (t) ≤ s˜mi (t), respectively, according to our
pricing scheme; the utility gain is non-positive by bidding
untruthfully since the charged price for buy-bid is the
same with that by bidding truthfully while there is non-
negative utility loss, by winning the sell-bid. If it loses
the sell-bid, we have that the charged prices for buy-bid
and sell-bid are both 0, according to our pricing scheme,
and no VM is bought or sold by cloud i; the utility gain
is zero by bidding untruthfully.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) < b˜mi (t) and smi (t) > s˜mi (t):
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It is easy to see that cloud i still loses both the buy-
bid and the sell-bid, since otherwise we will have a
contradiction to Lemma 2. Hence, the charged/paid prices
for buy-bid and sell-bid are both 0, according to our
pricing scheme. The utility gain is zero by bidding
untruthfully.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) < b˜mi (t) and smi (t) = s˜mi (t):
It is easy to see that cloud i still loses the buy-bid, since
otherwise we will have a contradiction to Lemma 2. It
is also not hard to find that cloud i still loses the sell-
bid with the same bidding price. Hence, the charged/paid
prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are both 0, according to
our pricing scheme. The utility gain is zero by bidding
untruthfully.
• Bid untruthfully with bmi (t) < b˜mi (t) and smi (t) < s˜mi (t):
It is easy to see that cloud i still loses the buy-bid,
since otherwise we will have a contradiction to Lemma 2.
However, it may either win or lose the sell-bid. If it wins
the sell-bid, we have that the charged/paid prices for buy-
bid and sell-bid are 0 and ϑmj′ (t) ≤ s˜mi (t), respectively,
according to our pricing scheme; the utility gain is non-
positive by bidding untruthfully since the charged price
for buy-bid is the same with that by bidding truthfully
while there is non-negative utility loss, by winning the
sell-bid. If it loses the sell-bid, we have that the charged
prices for buy-bid and sell-bid are both 0, according to
our pricing scheme, and no VM is bought or sold by
cloud i; the utility gain is zero by bidding untruthfully.
To conclude, we have shown that bidding truthfully is the
dominant strategy of each cloud.
APPENDIX E
PROOF TO THEOREM 3
We prove the individual rationality for buy-bids and sell-
bids, respectively.
Winner of buy-bid: If cloud i wins the buy-bid for VM type
m, we have that bmi (t) is the largest buy-bid price among
all buy-bids, and bmi (t) ≥ θm2 (t), according to our winner
determination scheme. Since bˆmi (t) = θm2 (t) according to our
pricing scheme, we have that bˆmi (t) ≤ bmi (t).
Winner of sell-bid: If cloud i wins the sell-bid for VM type
m, we have that smi (t) is among the (j′− 1)th lowest sell-bid
prices of all sell-bids, and smi (t) ≤ ϑmj′ (t) according to our
winner determination scheme. Since sˆmi (t) = ϑmj′ (t) according
to our pricing scheme, we have that sˆmi (t) ≥ smi (t).
APPENDIX F
PROOF TO THEOREM 4
We first calculate the total payment from the buyers and the
total price paid to the sellers, respectively. We then show that
the ex-post budget balance is guaranteed.
Total payment from the buyers: According to our winner
determination scheme, only the buyer with largest bidding
price wins the buy-bid. With the pricing scheme in Eqn. (32),
the charged price is θm2 (t) for each bought VM. With the
allocation scheme in Eqn. (34), the overall number of bought
VMs is
∑j′−1
j=1 L
m
j (t). Hence, the total payment from the
buyers is that
∑
i∈[1,F ]
[ˆbmi (t) · γˆ
m
i (t)] = θ
m
2 (t) ·
j′−1∑
j=1
Lmj (t).
Overall price paid to the sellers: According to our winner
determination scheme, only the seller with (j′ − 1)th lowest
bidding price wins the sell-bid. With the pricing scheme in
Eqn. (33), the paid price is ϑmj′ (t) for each sold VM. With
the allocation scheme in Eqn. (35), the overall number of sold
VMs is
∑j′−1
j=1 L
m
j (t). Hence, the total payment to the sellers
is that
∑
i∈[1,F ]
[sˆmi (t) · ηˆ
m
i (t)] = ϑ
m
j′ (t) ·
j′−1∑
j=1
Lmj (t).
According to Eqn. (31) for the winner determination
scheme, we know that ϑmj′ (t) ≤ θm2 (t). Hence, the ex-post
budget balance at the auctioneer for each VM type m ∈ [1,M ]
can be guaranteed as follows,∑
i∈[1,F ]
[ˆbmi (t) · γˆ
m
i (t)− sˆ
m
i (t) · ηˆ
m
i (t)]
=
∑
i∈[1,F ]
[ˆbmi (t) · γˆ
m
i (t)]−
∑
i∈[1,F ]
[sˆmi (t) · ηˆ
m
i (t)]
=θm2 (t) ·
j′−1∑
j=1
Lmj (t)− ϑ
m
j′ (t) ·
j′−1∑
j=1
Lmj (t)
≥0.
APPENDIX G
PROOF TO LEMMA 1
We prove the lemma by induction.
Induction Basis: At time slot 0, the beginning of the federa-
tion, all queues are empty. Therefore,
Qsi (0) = 0 ≤ Q
s(max)
i , ∀i ∈ [1, F ], s ∈ [1, S],
Zsi (0) = 0 ≤ Z
s(max)
i , ∀i ∈ [1, F ], s ∈ [1, S].
Induction Step: Suppose that, at time slot t ≥ 0, Qsi (t) ≤
Q
s(max)
i and Zsi (t) ≤ Z
s(max)
i , ∀i ∈ [1, F ], s ∈ [1, S]. Then,
for any Qsi (t) and Zsi (t), we have the following possible cases.
• 0 ≤ Qsi (t) ≤ V ξ
s
i or V ξ
s
i < Q
s
i (t) ≤ V ξ
s
i +R
s
i ;
• 0 ≤ Zsi (t) ≤ V ξ
s
i or V ξ
s
i < Z
s
i (t) ≤ V ξ
s
i + ǫs.
- We first analyze the size of Qsi (t+ 1):
• If 0 ≤ Qsi (t) ≤ V ξsi , we have that
Qsi (t+ 1) = max{Q
s
i (t)−
F∑
j=1
µsij(t)−D
s
i (t), 0}+ r
s
i (t)
≤ max{Qsi (t), 0}+R
s
i
≤ V ξsi +R
s
i = Q
s(max)
i
according to the queueing law (2). The first inequality is
based on the fact that 0 ≤ rsi (t) ≤ Rsi .
• If V ξsi < Qsi (t) ≤ V ξsi +Rsi , we have that
Dsi (t) = D
s(max)
i ,
according to the job drop decision with Eqn. (30).
Hence, we have that
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Qsi (t+ 1) = max{Q
s
i (t)−
F∑
j=1
µsij(t)−D
s
i (t), 0}+ r
s
i (t)
≤ max{V ξsi +R
s
i −D
s(max)
i , 0}+R
s
i
≤ V ξsi +R
s
i ≤ Q
s(max)
i .
The second inequality is based on the fact that Ds(max)i ≥
max{Rsi , ǫs}.
So far, Qsi (t) ≤ Q
s(max)
i , ∀i ∈ [1, F ], s ∈ [1, S] for each
time slot t is proved.
- We next analyze the size of Zsi (t+ 1):
• If 0 ≤ Zsi (t) ≤ V ξsi , we have that
Zsi (t+ 1) = max{Z
s
i (t) + 1{Qs
i
(t)>0} · [ǫs −
F∑
j=1
µsij(t)]−D
s
i (t)
− 1{Qs
i
(t)=0} ·
F∑
j=1
Cmsj ·N
ms
j
gs
, 0}
≤ max{Zsi (t) + ǫs, 0}
≤ V ξsi + ǫs = Z
s(max)
i ,
according to the queueing law (4). The first inequality is
based on the fact that ǫs > 0.
• If V ξsi < Zsi (t) ≤ V ξsi + ǫs, we have that
Dsi (t) = D
s(max)
i ,
according to the job drop decision with Eqn. (30).
Hence, we have that
Zsi (t+ 1) = max{Z
s
i (t) + 1{Qsi (t)>0} · [ǫs −
F∑
j=1
µsij(t)]−D
s
i (t)
− 1{Qs
i
(t)=0} ·
F∑
j=1
Cmsj ·N
ms
j
gs
, 0}
≤ max{Zsi (t) + ǫs −D
s(max)
i , 0}
≤ V ξsi + ǫs = Z
s(max)
i .
The second inequality is based on the fact that Ds(max)i ≥
max{Rsi , ǫs}.
So far, Zsi (t) ≤ Z
s(max)
i , ∀i ∈ [1, F ], s ∈ [1, S] for each
time slot t is proved.
In conclusion, Lemma 1 is proven.
APPENDIX H
PROOF TO THEOREM 5
We prove this theorem by contradiction.
For each cloud i ∈ [1, F ] and each service type s ∈ [1, S],
the job requests arrive at time slot t ≥ 0 is rsi (t) and the
earliest time they can depart the queue is t+1. We show that
all these jobs depart (by being either scheduled or dropped)
on or before time t+ ds.
Suppose this is not true, we will come to a contradiction.
We must have that Qsi (τ) > 0 for all τ ∈ [t + 1, . . . , t + ds]
(otherwise, all the jobs are scheduled by time t + ds). With
the queueing law in Eqn. (4), we have that
Zsi (τ + 1) = max{Z
s
i (τ ) + ǫs −
F∑
j=1
µsij(τ )−D
s
i (τ ), 0}
≥ Zsi (τ ) + ǫs −
F∑
j=1
µsij(τ )−D
s
i (τ ).
Summing the above over τ ∈ [t + 1, . . . , t + ds], we have
that
Zsi (t+ ds + 1) − Z
s
i (t+ 1) ≥ ǫsds −
t+ds∑
τ=t+1
[
F∑
j=1
µsij(τ ) +D
s
i (τ )].
Rearranging the above inequality and using the fact that
Zsi (t+ ds + 1) ≤ Z
s(max)
i and Zsi (t+ 1) ≥ 0, we have that
ǫsds − Z
s(max)
i ≤
t+ds∑
τ=t+1
[
F∑
j=1
µsij(τ ) +D
s
i (τ )]. (52)
Since the jobs are scheduled in a FIFO fashion, the jobs
rsi (t) that arrive at slot t are placed at the end of the queue at
slot t+ 1, and should be fully cleared only when all the jobs
backlogged in Qsi (t+1) have been scheduled. That is, the last
job of rsi (t) departs on slot t+ T with T > 0 as the smallest
integer satisfying
∑t+T
τ=t+1[
∑F
j=1 µ
s
ij(τ)+D
s
i (τ)] ≥ Q
s
i (t+1).
Based on our assumption that not all of the rsi (t) jobs depart
by time t+ ds, we must have that
t+ds∑
τ=t+1
[
F∑
j=1
µsij(τ ) +D
s
i (τ )] < Q
s
i (t+ 1) ≤ Q
s(max)
i . (53)
Combining Eqn. (52) and (54), we have that
ǫsds − Z
s(max)
i < Q
s(max)
i (54)
⇒ǫs <
Q
s(max)
i + Z
s(max)
i
ds
. (55)
This contradicts with the given fact that ǫs =
Q
s(max)
i +Z
s(max)
i
ds
. Hence, we have proved that each job of type
s ∈ [1, S] is either scheduled or dropped with Alg. 1 before its
maximum response delay ds, if we set ǫs = Q
s(max)
i
+Z
s(max)
i
ds
.
APPENDIX I
PROOF TO THEOREM 6
Since the system status, i.e., the job arrival rsi (t) and
service pricing psi (t) of each type s ∈ [1, S] of services
and the operational price βi(t) at each cloud i ∈ [1, F ],
changes with ergodic processes, we have that there exists
a stationary randomized algorithm [19], which dynamically
decides the VM valuation & pricing (with bm∗i (t), γm∗i (t),
sm∗i (t), η
m∗
i (t)), job scheduling (with µs∗ij (t)) & dropping
(with Ds∗i (t)) and server provisioning (with nm∗i (t)) at each
cloud i, such that the offline optimum of cloud i’s individual
profit Ω∗i can be achieved, together with r¯si ≤
∑F
j=1 µ¯
s∗
ij +D¯
s∗
i
and ǫs ≤
∑F
j=1 µ¯
s∗
ij + D¯
s∗
i . Here, a¯ denotes the time averaged
expectation of variable a(t).
Based on the derivations of the optimization problem (18)
in and its solution in Sec. IV, we know that Algorithm 1
minimizes the right-hand-side of the drift-plus-penalty (drift-
minus-utility) inequality in Eqn. (17) at each slot t, with
22
individual profit maximization as the utility, over all possible
algorithms. Then, we can have that
∆(Θi(t))− V · [
∑
m∈[1,M]
[sˆmi (t)ηˆ
m
i (t)− bˆ
m
i (t)γˆ
m
i (t)− βi(t)n
m
i (t)]
−
∑
s∈[1,S]
Dsi (t)ξ
s
i +
∑
s∈[1,S]
rsi (t)p
s
i (t)]
≤Bi +
∑
s∈[1,S]
[Qsi (t)r
s
i (t) + Z
s
i (t)ǫs] +
∑
s∈[1,S]
[rsi (t)p
s
i (t)]
− V
∑
m∈[1,M]
[sˆm∗i (t)ηˆ
m∗
i (t)− bˆ
m∗
i (t)γˆ
m∗
i (t)− βi(t)n
m∗
i (t)]
−
∑
s=∈[1,S]
∑
j∈[1,F ]
µs∗ij (t)[Q
s
i (t) + Z
s
i (t)]
−
∑
s∈[1,S]
Ds∗i (t)[Q
s
i (t) + Z
s
i (t)− V · ξ
s
i ]
=Bi − V · [
∑
m∈[1,M]
[sˆm∗i (t)ηˆ
m∗
i (t)− bˆ
m∗
i (t)γˆ
m∗
i (t)− βi(t)n
m∗
i (t)]
−
∑
s∈[1,S]
Ds∗i (t)ξ
s
i +
∑
s∈[1,S]
rsi (t)p
s
i (t)]
+
∑
s∈[1,S]
[Qsi (t)[r
s
i (t)−
∑
j∈[1,F ]
µs∗ij (t)−D
s∗
i (t)]
+ Zsi (t)[ǫs −
∑
j∈[1,F ]
µs∗ij (t)−D
s∗
i (t)]].
Taking conditional expectations over queue status Θi(t) on
both sides the inequality, we have that
E{∆(Θi(t))|Θi(t)} − V · E{[
∑
m∈[1,M]
[sˆmi (t)ηˆ
m
i (t)− bˆ
m
i (t)γˆ
m
i (t)
− βi(t)n
m
i (t)]−
∑
s∈[1,S]
Dsi (t)ξ
s
i +
∑
s∈[1,S]
[rsi (t)p
s
i (t)]]|Θi(t)}
≤Bi − V · E{[
∑
m∈[1,M]
[sˆm∗i (t)ηˆ
m∗
i (t)− bˆ
m∗
i (t)γˆ
m∗
i (t)− βi(t)n
m∗
i (t)]
−
∑
s∈[1,S]
Ds∗i (t)ξ
s
i +
∑
s∈[1,S]
[rsi (t)p
s
i (t)]]|Θi(t)}
+
∑
s∈[1,S]
[Qsi (t)E{[r
s
i (t)−
F∑
j=1
µs∗ij (t)−D
s∗
i (t)]|Θi(t)}
+ Zsi (t)E{[ǫs −
F∑
j=1
µs∗ij (t)−D
s∗
i (t)]|Θi(t)}].
Next, we take expectations on both sides the inequality, we
have that
E{∆(Θi(t))} − V · E{[
∑
m∈[1,M]
[sˆmi (t)ηˆ
m
i (t)− bˆ
m
i (t)γˆ
m
i (t)
− βi(t)n
m
i (t)]−
∑
s∈[1,S]
Dsi (t)ξ
s
i +
∑
s∈[1,S]
[rsi (t)p
s
i (t)]]}
≤Bi − V · E{[
∑
m∈[1,M]
[sˆm∗i (t)ηˆ
m∗
i (t)− bˆ
m∗
i (t)γˆ
m∗
i (t)− βi(t)n
m∗
i (t)]
−
∑
s∈[1,S]
Ds∗i (t)ξ
s
i +
∑
s∈[1,S]
[rsi (t)p
s
i (t)]]}
+
∑
s∈[1,S]
[Qsi (t)E{[r
s
i (t)−
F∑
j=1
µs∗ij (t)−D
s∗
i (t)]}
+ Zsi (t)E{[ǫs −
F∑
j=1
µs∗ij (t)−D
s∗
i (t)]}].
By summing over the T slots on both sides of the inequality,
we have that
E{L(Θi(T ))} − E{L(Θi(0))} − V ·
T−1∑
t=0
E{[
∑
m∈[1,M]
[sˆmi (t)ηˆ
m
i (t)
− bˆmi (t)γˆ
m
i (t)− βi(t)n
m
i (t)]−
∑
s∈[1,S]
Dsi (t)ξ
s
i +
∑
s∈[1,S]
[rsi (t)p
s
i (t)]]}
≤T ·Bi − V ·
T−1∑
t=0
E{[
∑
m∈[1,M]
[sˆm∗i (t)ηˆ
m∗
i (t)− bˆ
m∗
i (t)γˆ
m∗
i (t)
− βi(t)n
m∗
i (t)]−
∑
s∈[1,S]
Ds∗i (t)ξ
s
i +
∑
s∈[1,S]
[rsi (t)p
s
i (t)]]}
+
T−1∑
t=0
∑
s∈[1,S]
[Qsi (t)E{[r
s
i (t)−
F∑
j=1
µs∗ij (t)−D
s∗
i (t)]}
+ Zsi (t)E{[ǫs −
F∑
j=1
µs∗ij (t)−D
s∗
i (t)]}].
Since E{L(Θi(T ))} ≥ 0 and E{L(Θi(0))} = 0 according
to the definition of the Lyapunov function, we have that
− V ·
T−1∑
t=0
E{[
∑
m∈[1,M]
[sˆmi (t)ηˆ
m
i (t)− bˆ
m
i (t)γˆ
m
i (t)− βi(t)n
m
i (t)]
−
∑
s∈[1,S]
Dsi (t)ξ
s
i +
∑
s∈[1,S]
[rsi (t)p
s
i (t)]]}
≤T · Bi − V ·
T−1∑
t=0
E{[
∑
m∈[1,M]
[sˆm∗i (t)ηˆ
m∗
i (t)− bˆ
m∗
i (t)γˆ
m∗
i (t)
− βi(t)n
m∗
i (t)]−
∑
s∈[1,S]
Ds∗i (t)ξ
s
i +
∑
s∈[1,S]
[rsi (t)p
s
i (t)]]}
+
T−1∑
t=0
∑
s∈[1,S]
[Qsi (t)E{[r
s
i (t)−
F∑
j=1
µs∗ij (t)−D
s∗
i (t)]}
+ Zsi (t)E{[ǫs −
F∑
j=1
µs∗ij (t)−D
s∗
i (t)]}].
Dividing T · V on both sides of the above inequality and
taking limitation on T to infinity, we have that
−Ωi ≤Bi/V −Ω
∗
i +
∑
s∈[1,S]
[Q¯si [r¯
s
i −
F∑
j=1
µ¯s∗ij − D¯
s∗
i ]
+ Z¯si [ǫs −
F∑
j=1
µ¯s∗ij − D¯
s∗
i ]]
≤Bi/V −Ω
∗
i .
The second inequality comes from the fact that r¯si −∑F
j=1 µ¯
s∗
ij − D¯
s∗
i ≤ 0 and ǫs −
∑F
j=1 µ¯
s∗
ij − D¯
s∗
i ≤ 0.
Rearranging the two sides, we have that
Ωi ≥ Ω
∗
i −Bi/V,
APPENDIX J
PROOF TO THEOREM 7
Similar with the proof to the optimality of individual profit
with Alg. 1, we have the following proof to the optimality in
social welfare for our benchmark algorithm. Since the system
status, i.e., the job arrival rsi (t) and service pricing psi (t) of
each type s ∈ [1, S] of services and the operational price βi(t)
at each cloud i ∈ [1, F ], changes with ergodic processes,
23
[19], which dynamically decides the job scheduling (with
µs∗ij (t)) & dropping (with Ds∗i (t)) and server provisioning
(with nm∗i (t)) at each cloud i, such that the offline optimum of
the federation’s social welfare
∏∗
can be achieved, together
with r¯s∗i ≤
∑F
j=1 µ¯
s∗
ij +D¯
s∗
i and ǫs ≤
∑F
j=1 µ¯
s∗
ij +D¯
s∗
i . Here,
a¯ denotes the time averaged expectation of variable a(t).
Based on the above derivations of the optimization problem
(40) and its solution in Alg. 2, we know that Algorithm 2
minimizes the right-hand-side of the drift-plus-penalty (drift-
minus-welfare) inequality in Eqn. (37) at each slot t, with
social welfare maximization as the utility, over all possible
algorithms. Then, we can have that
∆(Θ(t)) + V ·
∑
i∈[1,F ]
[
∑
m∈[1,M]
[βi(t)n
m
i (t)] +
∑
s∈[1,S]
Dsi (t)ξ
s
i
−
∑
s∈[1,S]
rsi (t)p
s
i (t)]
≤B +
∑
i∈[1,F ]
[
∑
s∈[1,S]
[Qsi (t)r
s
i (t) + Z
s
i (t)ǫs]− V
∑
s∈[1,S]
rsi (t)p
s
i (t)]
+ V
∑
i∈[1,F ]
∑
m∈[1,M]
[βi(t)n
m∗
i (t)]
−
∑
i∈[1,F ]
∑
s=∈[1,S]
∑
j∈[1,F ]
µs∗ij (t)[Q
s
i (t) + Z
s
i (t)]
−
∑
i∈[1,F ]
∑
s∈[1,S]
Ds∗i (t)[Q
s
i (t) + Z
s
i (t)− V · ξ
s
i ]
=B + V ·
∑
i∈[1,F ]
[
∑
m∈[1,M]
[βi(t)n
m∗
i (t)] +
∑
s∈[1,S]
Ds∗i (t)ξ
s
i
−
∑
s∈[1,S]
rsi (t)p
s
i (t)]
+
∑
i∈[1,F ]
∑
s∈[1,S]
[Qsi (t)[r
s
i (t)−
F∑
j=1
µs∗ij (t)−D
s∗
i (t)]
+ Zsi (t)[ǫs −
F∑
j=1
µs∗ij (t)−D
s∗
i (t)]].
Taking conditional expectations over queue status Θ(t) on
both sides the inequality, we have that
E{∆(Θ(t))|Θ(t)}+ V ·
∑
i∈[1,F ]
E{[
∑
m∈[1,M]
βi(t)n
m
i (t)
+
∑
s∈[1,S]
Dsi (t)ξ
s
i −
∑
s∈[1,S]
rsi (t)p
s
i (t)]|Θ(t)}
≤B + V ·
∑
i∈[1,F ]
E{[
∑
m∈[1,M]
βi(t)n
m∗
i (t) +
∑
s∈[1,S]
Ds∗i (t)ξ
s
i
−
∑
s∈[1,S]
rsi (t)p
s
i (t)]|Θ(t)}
+
∑
i∈[1,F ]
∑
s∈[1,S]
[Qsi (t)E{[r
s
i (t)−
F∑
j=1
µs∗ij (t)−D
s∗
i (t)]|Θ(t)}
+ Zsi (t)E{[ǫs −
F∑
j=1
µs∗ij (t)−D
s∗
i (t)]|Θ(t)}].
Next, we take expectations on both sides the inequality, we
have that
E{∆(Θ(t))}+ V ·
∑
i∈[1,F ]
E{[
∑
m∈[1,M]
βi(t)n
m
i (t) +
∑
s∈[1,S]
Dsi (t)ξ
s
i
−
∑
s∈[1,S]
rsi (t)p
s
i (t)]}
≤B + V ·
∑
i∈[1,F ]
E{[
∑
m∈[1,M]
βi(t)n
m∗
i (t) +
∑
s∈[1,S]
Ds∗i (t)ξ
s
i
−
∑
s∈[1,S]
rsi (t)p
s
i (t)]}
+
∑
i∈[1,F ]
∑
s∈[1,S]
[Qsi (t)E{[r
s
i (t)−
F∑
j=1
µs∗ij (t)−D
s∗
i (t)]}
+ Zsi (t)E{[ǫs −
F∑
j=1
µs∗ij (t)−D
s∗
i (t)]}].
By summing over the T slots on both sides of the inequality,
we have that
E{L(Θ(T ))} − E{L(Θ(0))} − V ·
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i∈[1,F ]
E{[
∑
m∈[1,M]
βi(t)n
m
i (t)
+
∑
s∈[1,S]
Dsi (t)ξ
s
i −
∑
s∈[1,S]
rsi (t)p
s
i (t)]}
≤T ·B + V ·
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i∈[1,F ]
E{[
∑
m∈[1,M]
βi(t)n
m∗
i (t) +
∑
s∈[1,S]
Ds∗i (t)ξ
s
i
−
∑
s∈[1,S]
rsi (t)p
s
i (t)]}
+
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i∈[1,F ]
∑
s∈[1,S]
[Qsi (t)E{[r
s
i (t)−
F∑
j=1
µs∗ij (t)−D
s∗
i (t)]}
+ Zsi (t)E{[ǫs −
F∑
j=1
µs∗ij (t)−D
s∗
i (t)]}].
Since E{L(Θ(T ))} ≥ 0 and E{L(Θ(0))} = 0 according to
the definition of the Lyapunov function, we have that
− V ·
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i∈[1,F ]
E{[
∑
m∈[1,M]
βi(t)n
m
i (t) +
∑
s∈[1,S]
Dsi (t)ξ
s
i
−
∑
s∈[1,S]
rsi (t)p
s
i (t)]}
≤T ·B + V ·
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i∈[1,F ]
E{[
∑
m∈[1,M]
βi(t)n
m∗
i (t) +
∑
s∈[1,S]
Ds∗i (t)ξ
s
i
−
∑
s∈[1,S]
rsi (t)p
s
i (t)]}
+
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i∈[1,F ]
∑
s∈[1,S]
[Qsi (t)E{[r
s
i (t)−
F∑
j=1
µs∗ij (t)−D
s∗
i (t)]}
+ Zsi (t)E{[ǫs −
F∑
j=1
µs∗ij (t)−D
s∗
i (t)]}].
Dividing T · V on both sides and taking limitation on T to
24
infinity, we have that
−Π ≤B/V − Π∗
+
∑
i∈[1,F ]
∑
s∈[1,S]
[Q¯si [r¯
s
i −
F∑
j=1
µ¯s∗ij − D¯
s∗
i ]
+ Z¯si [ǫs −
F∑
j=1
µ¯s∗ij − D¯
s∗
i ]]
≤B/V − Π∗.
The second inequality is based on the fact that r¯si −∑F
j=1 µ¯
s∗
ij − D¯
s∗
i ≤ 0 and ǫs −
∑F
j=1 µ¯
s∗
ij − D¯
s∗
i ≤ 0.
Rearranging the two sides, we have that
Π ≥ Π∗ −B/V,
APPENDIX K
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We have shown that, Algorithm 2 achieves a social welfare
with a constant gap to the offline optimum, by minimizing the
RHS of drift-plus-penalty inequality in Eqn. (37) according to
the Lyapunov optimization theory [19]. Hence, if we can prove
that, Algorithm 1 can also minimize the RHS of Eqn. (37),
i.e., maximizing problem (38) and (39), we can also prove its
social welfare optimality. Our intuition of the proof is that,
when the number of clouds in the federation grows to infinity,
the gap to the minimum of RHS of Eqn. (37), i.e., the gap
to the maximum of problem (38) and (39), by Algorithm 1 is
infinitely close to zero.
– Gap to the minimum of RHS of Eqn. (37) with Algorithm 1:
As discussed above, problem (39) is only controlled by
the job drop decisions, i.e., Dsi (t). Since Algorithm 1 and
Algorithm 2 have the same decision on job dropping as in
Eqn. (30) and Eqn. (46), the maximum of problem (39) is also
achieved by Algorithm 1. Hence, the gap to the minimum of
RHS of Eqn. (37), by Algorithm 1 only depends on its gap
to the maximum of problem (38), which is determined by the
job scheduling and server provisioning decisions.
We first map the job scheduling and server provisioning
decisions in Algorithm 2 to an equivalent VM allocation based
on an idealized double auction scenario. Let each cloud still
proposes its buy-bid and sell-bid based on the true valuations
given in Eqn. (21), (22), (25) and (26).
With Eqn. (21), we have that the price of buy-bid for VM
type m at cloud i is 1
V
of the maximum weight among all
jobs at this cloud demanding type-m VMs. With the winner
determination of our double auction mechanism, θm1 (t) is the
maximum price of buy-bids from all clouds for type-m VMs.
Hence, the cloud with buy-bid θm1 (t) has the maximum weight
among all jobs demanding type-m VMs at all clouds.
According to the definition of < i´m, s´m > in Eqn. (45),
we know that jobs of service type s´m at cloud i´m has the
maximum weight for VM type m over all service types at
each cloud demanding for the same VMs. Hence, cloud i´m
proposes the maximum buy-bid price θm1 (t), which is 1V of
the weight of type-s´m jobs at cloud i´m.
With Eqn. (22), we have that the price of sell-bid for VM
type m at cloud i is the larger one between i) 1
V
of the
maximum weight among all jobs at this cloud demanding type-
m VMs; and ii) the per-VM operational price βi(t)/Cmi at
cloud i. With the winner determination of our double auction
mechanism, ϑmj (t) is the jth lowest price of sell-bids from all
clouds for type-m VMs.
If the maximum buy-bid price θm1 (t) is larger than the jth
lowest sell-bid price ϑmj (t), we have that i) with an idealized
double auction, cloud i´m has a higher buy-bid price than the
sell-bid such that it can buy all VMs of type m from the
cloud proposing ϑmj (t); ii) with the job scheduling decision in
Eqn. (44), all VMs of type m are allocated for job scheduling
at cloud i´m for service type s´m. Hence, the job scheduling
decision in Algorithm 2 is equivalent to the idealized double
auction that, the bidder with highest buy-bid price can buy all
VMs from those sellers with a lower sell-bid price. Fig. 5 gives
an illustration for the case. In Fig. 5, the buy-bids are sorted
in descending order while the sell-bids are sorted in ascending
order. Let there are k sell-bids with lower price than that of
the highest buy-bid θm1 (t). Here, k is the maximum number
of sell-bids, whose prices ϑmj (t) (j ∈ [1, k]) are lower than
that of the highest buy-bid θm1 (t), i.e.,
k = arg max
i∈[1,F ]
{ϑmj (t) < θ
m
1 (t)|∀j ∈ [1, i]}.
We know that all the k sellers sell all VMs of type m to the
cloud with θm1 (t), i.e., cloud i´m.
However, the idealized cloud cannot give truthfulness guar-
antee. With our double auction mechanism, in Fig. 5, only
the (j′ − 1) sellers, whose sell-bid prices are no larger than
the second highest buy-bid price θm2 (t), will sell their VMs
to cloud i´m. Here, j′ is the maximum number of sellers with
sell-bid prices no larger than θm2 (t), as defined in Eqn. (31).
Hence, the gap to the maximum of problem (38) by Algorithm
1 is determined by the VMs that are not sold to cloud i´m by
sellers between j′ and k.
If these VMs of type m are allocated to cloud i´m with
Algorithm 2, their utility gain in problem (38) is that
∑
j=[j′,k]
[
Qs´m
i´m
(t) + Z s´m
i´m
(t)
gs´m
− V βj/C
m
j ] · C
m
j N
m
j
=
∑
j=[j′,k]
[θm1 (t)− βj/C
m
j ] · V · L
m
j (t).
Here, the server provisioning decisions, i.e., nmi (t), are re-
placed by job scheduling decisions, i.e., µsij(t), according to
Eqn. (43) in Algorithm 2.
If these VMs of type m of sellers j ∈ [j′, k] are not traded to
cloud i´m based on our double auction mechanism, these VMs
are either scheduled to serve the jobs with maximum weight
at its own cloud, if the maximum weight is higher than the
per-VM operational price, or inactivated otherwise, according
to the job scheduling decision in Eqn. (28) of Algorithm 1.
Hence, the utility gain of these VMs for problem (38) with
Algorithm 1 is that∑
j=[j′,k]
[ϑmj (t)− βj/C
m
j ] · V · L
m
j (t).
So, the gap to the maximum of problem (38) by Algorithm
1 is the difference between the above utility gains, as follows,
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V ·
∑
j=[j′,k]
[θm1 (t)− ϑ
m
j (t)] · L
m
j (t), (56)
which is equivalent to the size of the shadow area in Fig. 5,
multiplied by V .
Since ϑmj (t) > θm2 (t) for each j ∈ [j′ + 1, k], we can give
an upperbound to the gap as follows,
V ·
∑
j=[j′,k]
[θm1 (t)− ϑ
m
j (t)] · L
m
j (t),
=V · [[θm1 (t)− ϑ
m
j′ (t)] · L
m
j′ (t) +
∑
j=[j′+1,k]
[θm1 (t)− ϑ
m
j (t)] · L
m
j (t)],
≤V · [[θm1 (t)− θ
m
2 (t) + ϑ
m
j′+1(t)− ϑ
m
j′ (t)] · L
m
j′ (t)
+
∑
j=[j′+1,k]
[θm1 (t)− θ
m
2 (t)] · L
m
j (t)]
=V · [[ϑmj′+1(t)− ϑ
m
j′ (t)] · L
m
j′ (t) +
∑
j=[j′,k]
[θm1 (t)− θ
m
2 (t)] · L
m
j (t)].
(57)
Since the system is homogenous with the same number of
servers for each VM type m at each cloud, the value of Lmj (t)
at each cloud j ∈ [1, F ] is also the same. We use Lm to denote
that value. Hence, the gap in Eqn. (57) can be rewritten as
V · Lm[[ϑmj′+1(t)− ϑ
m
j′ (t)] + [k − j
′][θm1 (t)− θ
m
2 (t)]]. (58)
j'
j'-1 j'
Buy-bids: 
descending order
Sell-bids: 
ascending order
 2
m
!j'
m
j'-1 j' k
 1
m Buy-bids: 
descending order
Sell-bids: 
ascending order
Fig. 5. Illustration of the auction.
We next show that, when the number of clouds scales to
infinity, the gap in Eqn. (58) is infinitely close to zero, by
analyzing the distribution of bidding prices based on the cloud
number F .
– Distribution of bidding prices:
The distribution of the bidding pric s should be analyzed in
order to find an analytical result between the size of the gap
in Eqn. (58) and the number of clouds F .
Let Θi(t) be the status of cloud i at time slot t. We see
that the status Θi(t) is a Markov chain with Algorithm 1.
Define S = {ρ : Pr(Θi(t) = ρ|Θi(0) = 0) for some t}, then
Θi(t) is an irreducible Markov chain on state space S with
Θi(0) = 0. This claim is true because i) any state in S is
reachable from 0 and ii) since Pr(rsi (t) = 0) > 0, ∀s ∈ [1, S],
the Markov chain can move from Θi(t) to 0 in finite time with
a positive probability. (Qsi (t) can be cleared by job scheduling
or dropping while virtual queue Zsi (t) can also be cleared after
Qsi (t) is zero for a constant time, according to the queueing
laws Eqn. (2) and (4)) Based on the same reason as above,
the state 0 is an aperiodic state. With Lemma 1 we know
that Qsi (t) and Zsi (t) have finite upperbounds, we can then
have that the state space S is also finite. In conclusion, the
Markov chain is irreducible with an aperiodic state and finite
state space. Hence, the Markov chain is ergodic.
We know that the prices of buy-bid and sell-bid for each VM
type m at cloud i are calculated with its current status Θi(t), as
well as the current operational price βi(t) (only for sell-bid),
according Alg. 1. Since the cloud’s status follows an ergodic
process and the operational price is also ergodic according
to our problem model, we know that the prices of buy-bid
and sell-bid are also ergodic. Recall that we are proving the
asymptotic optimality in social welfare by Algorithm 1 under
homogenous system settings. Hence, we can have that the
prices of buy-bids and sell-bids at different clouds follow the
same ergodic process.
Let the price of buy-bid for VM type m follow a distribution
E with continuous density e on the compact interval [0, b¯].
Here, b¯ = Q
s¯(max)
i
+Z
s¯(max)
i
V ·gs¯
, where s¯ is the service type with
maximum value of Q
s(max)
i
+Z
s(max)
i
V ·gs
among all types in [1, S]
with sm = m. Let the price of sell-bid for VM type m follow
a distribution H with continuous density h on the compact
interval [b
¯
, b¯]. Here, b
¯
= β
(min)
i /C
m
i . Denote the maximum
and minimum of e and h as follows,
emin = min
x∈[0,b¯]
e(x) > 0, emax = max
x∈[0,b¯]
e(x) > 0,
hmin = min
x∈[b
¯
,b¯]
h(x) > 0, hmax = max
x∈[b
¯
,b¯]
h(x) > 0.
Then, we can have the following lemma according to
Lemma 1 in [23],
Lemma 4:
1
emax(F + 1)
≤E{θj − θj+1} ≤
1
emin(F + 1)
, ∀j ∈ [1, F − 1],
1
hmax(F + 1)
≤E{ϑj+1 − ϑj} ≤
1
hmin(F + 1)
, ∀j ∈ [1, F − 1].
Here, E{·} denotes the expectation.
– Asymptotic Optimality in Minimizing the RHS of Eqn. (37)
with Algorithm 1:
With Lemma 4, we can further bound the gap in Eqn. (58)
to the maximum of problem (38) by Algorithm 1 as follows,
V · Lm[[ϑmj′+1(t)− ϑ
m
j′ (t)] + [k − j
′][θm1 (t)− θ
m
2 (t)]]
≤V · Lm[
1
hmin(F + 1)
+
k − j′
emin(F + 1)
]
Since each seller between j′ and k has a sell-bid price
between θm1 (t) and θm2 (t), the sell-bid prices of all these
sellers resides in an interval which has an expectation no larger
than 1
emin(F+1) . On the other hand, since the expected interval
between each sell-bid is no smaller than 1
hmax(F+1) , we know
that the expected interval between the j′ seller and the k seller
should be no smaller than k−j
′
hmax(F+1) , which should be still
no larger than 1
emin(F+1) . Hence, we have that
k − j′
hmax(F + 1)
≤
1
emin(F + 1)
⇒k − j′ ≤
hmax
emin
.
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Finally, we can bound the gap to the maximum of problem
(38) by Algorithm 1 as follows,
V · Lm[
1
hmin(F + 1)
+
hmax/emin
emin(F + 1)
].
It is clear that this gap is infinitely close to zero when the
number of cloud in the federation F grows to infinity.
– Asymptotic Optimality in Social Welfare of Algorithm 1:
When the number of clouds in the federation scales to
infinite large, i.e., F →∞, the RHS of Eqn. (37) is minimized
in each time slot t with our Algorithm 1 and our double
auction mechanism. Thus, following the same steps, as above,
to prove the social welfare optimality of Algorithm 2, which
also minimizes the RHS of Eqn. (37) in each time slot t, we
can prove that the time-averaged social welfare achieved with
our Algorithm 1 is within a constant gap B/V from the offline
optimum Π∗, when F →∞, i.e.,
Π ≥ Π∗ −B/V,
